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Abstract 
 
The reliability of the household consumption based (Engel curve) methodology in detecting gender 
bias has been called into question because it has generally failed to confirm bias even where it exists.  This 
paper seeks to find explanations for this failure by exploiting a dataset that has educational expenditure 
information at the individual level and also, by aggregation, at the household level.  We find that in the 
basic education age groups, the discriminatory mechanism in education is via differential enrolment rates 
for boys and girls.  Education expenditure conditional on enrolment is equal for boys and girls. The Engel 
curve method fails for two reasons.  Firstly, it models a single equation for the two stage process.  Second, 
even  when  we  make  individual  and  household  level  expenditure  equations  as  similar  as  possible,  the 
household level  equation still fails to  ‘pick up’  gender bias in about one third  of the cases  where the 
individual-level equation shows significant bias. The paper concludes that only individual based data can 
accurately capture the full extent of gender bias.     
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence:  Geeta G. Kingdon, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UQ, 
United Kingdom; tel: 00 44 1865 271065; email: geeta.kingdon@economics.ox.ac.uk 
 
 
Acknowledgements:  I would like to thank Angus Deaton, Jean Drèze, Marcel Fafchamps, Måns Söderbom, 
Shankar  Subramaniam,  Francis  Teal  and  participants  at  the  NEUDC  conference  at  Yale  University 
(especially Nistha Sinha) for helpful comments on this paper.  I am also grateful for the generous help of 
Abusaleh Shariff with the dataset and of Måns Söderbom with STATA programming. Any errors are mine.  
The research was supported by a Wellcome Trust grant No. 053660 and by an ESRC grant under the Global 
Poverty Research Group.  The acquisition of the data was funded by DFID, India.    2 
Where has all the bias gone?   
Detecting gender-bias in the household allocation of educational expenditure 
 
1.  Introduction 
Two  approaches  have  been  used  in  the  literature  to  detect  gender  bias  in  the  intra-household 
allocation  of  consumption  or  expenditure:  the  direct  comparison  of  expenditure  on  males  and  females 
where data is available at the level of the individual, and the indirect household expenditure methodology 
commonly referred to as the Engel curve approach.  Since information on the consumption of/expenditure 
on each individual member of a household is typically not available in household surveys (where generally 
only total household expenditure on specific items is available), it is usually not possible to directly observe 
gender bias in the allocation  of  expenditure  within the  household.  A researcher  must perforce use an 
indirect  method.    The  Engel  curve  method  seeks  to  detect  differential  treatment  within  the  household 
indirectly by examining how household expenditure on a particular good changes with household gender 
composition.   
 
However, the reliability of the Engel curve methodology as a way of detecting gender bias has been 
called into question because it has generally failed to confirm discrimination even where it is known to exist 
(Deaton, 1997, p239-41)
1.   Deaton notes: “it is a puzzle that expenditure patterns so consistently fail to 
show strong gender effects even when measures of outcomes show differences between girls and boys”. 
Case and Deaton (2003) say “it is not clear whether there really is no discrimination or whether, for some 
reason that is unclear, the method simply does not work”.  Ahmad and Morduch (2002) say “coupled with 
evidence on [significant gender differences in] mortality and health outcomes, the results on household 
expenditures pose a challenge in understanding consumer behaviour”. 
 
This paper tests two potential reasons for this puzzle. First, there are two possible channels through 
which pro-male bias may occur in expenditure on any particular commodity: one, via zero purchases for 
daughters and positive purchases for sons and two, conditional on positive purchase for both daughters and 
sons, via lower expenditure on daughters than on sons.  If gender bias operates through only one of these 
mechanisms, then averaging across the two mechanisms may lead to the conclusion of no significant gender 
bias.    Secondly, there is the issue of the effect of aggregation (of expenditure data across individuals 
within  the  household)  on  the  ability  to  detect  gender  bias  in  household  expenditures.    It  may  be  that 
somehow aggregation mutes gender effects. 
                                                 
1 For example, the use of the Engel curve method failed to detect significant differential treatment in the intra-
household distribution of food consumption in Maharashtra (Deaton and Subramanian, 1990) and also in Thailand and 
Cote d’Ivoire (Deaton, 1989).  It might be thought that much better laboratories to test the Engel curve techniques are 
provided by Indian states such as Rajasthan, Haryana, and Punjab with very skewed sex-ratios, or from Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, two countries from which comes much of the other evidence on differential treatment by gender.   
However a study by Subramanian (1995) failed to find evidence of gender bias in these three Indian states.   Similarly, 
Ahmad and Morduch (2002) found no evidence in favour of boys in Bangladesh even though the survey they use itself 
shows that there is an excess of boys over girls of 11%.  A similar finding of roughly identical treatment of boys and 
girls is confirmed for Pakistan (Deaton, 1997, p240; Bhalotra and Attfield, 1998) and with 1999-2000 NSS data for 
India (Case and Deaton, 2003).     3 
 
On  the  first  issue,  suppose  that  bias  against  girls  in  education  takes  the  form  mainly  of  zero 
expenditure on girls’ education (non-enrolment of girls), but that conditional on enrolment, expenditure on 
girls’  education is similar to that  on boys  or  even somewhat  exceeds that on boys – for, say, sample 
selectivity reasons or because certain components of expenditure on girls’ education are higher than those 
on boys (e.g. on school transport and clothing).  Then, averaging across these two mechanisms there may 
not be significant gender bias but, via the non-enrolment mechanism only, there may be strong bias.   Thus, 
one  would  be  interested  in  asking  whether  significant  bias  occurs  via  either  of  the  two  mechanisms 
separately and whether it is the averaging across the two mechanisms that leads to the conclusion of non-
bias.  One would be interested not only in the average unconditional expenditure on girls and boys but also 
in the distribution of the expenditure
2.   
 
Secondly, the failure of the conventional approach to detect gender discrimination may be to do 
with the aggregate nature of the data employed in the method.   Even expenditure on an individually-
assignable good such as education is at best typically available only at the household level, though it is, in 
principle, more readily measurable on an individual basis than food expenditure.  It could be that somehow 
household level analysis mutes gender effects. It could also be that the way in which household gender-age 
composition variables are defined makes it difficult to pick up discrimination. 
 
Much of the work using Engel curve methods has focused on detecting gender bias in the allocation 
of food.  Our focus here is on detecting gender bias in the allocation of education.   Previous work on India 
on the allocation of education expenditure using Engel curve methods has generally failed to find consistent 
evidence of gender bias.  For example, Subramanian and Deaton (1991) find that in NSS data from rural 
Maharashtra, there is no evidence of pro-boy gender bias in educational expenditure in the age groups 5 to 9 
and 15-54, though there is weak evidence of bias in the 10-14 age group.  Using similar NSS data from a 
decade  later,  Lancaster,  Maitra  and  Ray  (2003)  do  find  significant  gender  difference  in  educational 
expenditure in rural Bihar and rural Maharashtra in the age group 10-16 but not in urban areas and not in 
the primary school age-group 6-9.  In his study of five Indian states Subramanian (1995) wondered “how 
[to] explain the finding of discrimination against females under [age] 14 in only two states, when school 
enrolment data suggest discrimination is pervasive?”   
 
                                                 
2 Another reason why the conventional application of the Engel curve method may fail to pick up discrimination 
against girls even where it exists may be because the distributional assumption about the dependant variable and thus 
the specification of the budget-share equation are wrong.  For example, if the education budget-share for households 
with positive education spending is distributed log-normally but, because the budget-share equation is fitted on all 
(zero and positive education budget-share) households, one is obliged to use absolute budget-share rather than the log 
of budget-share as the dependant variable.  This would lead to incorrect standard errors.  However, this is not a 
particularly important worry in large samples, such as ours. 
   4 
Ahmad and Morduch (2002) provide some possible frameworks to explain the lack of evidence of 
gender bias in household consumption expenditures in Bangladesh.  One of their explanations is two-stage 
budgeting, namely that parents’ choices about aggregate expenditures is separable from their choices about 
how those expenditures are allocated.  That is, parents may not change buying habits (budget share on a 
commodity might remain unchanged with a change in gender composition of the household) but they might 
allot different portions of a commodity to sons than daughters.  This will not show up in investigations of 
aggregate expenditures but it will show up in investigations of individual outcomes
3. 
 
The 1994 NCAER rural household survey of 16 major states in India collected data on individual 
educational outcomes, i.e. on school enrolment, years of schooling, and education expenditure data on each 
household member aged <=35 years old.  Thus, it is possible - using this data - to investigate gender bias in 
the allocation of educational expenditure both by direct examination of educational spending on boys and 
girls, and also by the indirect Engel curve method.  In other words, it is possible to test whether the indirect, 
aggregate-data method confirms gender bias in states where the direct individual-data method shows bias.  
A vindication of the indirect methodology for detecting bias should be of considerable practical interest 
beyond this study and beyond India since most datasets only permit the use of the indirect method. 
 
Schooling has costs in India.  Even apparently ‘free’ government schooling has substantial costs 
such as expenditure on books, stationery, travel, and school uniform
4.   Some studies have also shown that 
girls are less likely to be sent to fee-charging private schools that are costlier (Drèze and Sen, 1995, p133; 
Kingdon, 1996a and 1996b).  Our data show that the overwhelming majority (98%) of enrolled 5-19 year 
olds have positive expenditure incurred on their education. 
 
In this paper we find that the Engel curve method does fail to find evidence of discrimination even 
when  significant  boy-girl  differences  are  manifest  in  individual  level  expenditure  data.  It  tests  two 
explanations  for  this  failure  outlined  above.  The  first  explanation  is  tested  by  separating  out  the  two 
mechanisms through which bias can occur, to ‘unpack’ the total gender bias into its two components. The 
second  potential  explanation,  namely  that  aggregation  is  responsible  for  the  failure  to  find  significant 
gender bias, is tested by examining whether the effects of gender variables in an education expenditure 
                                                 
3 Some of Ahmad and Morduch’s explanations are ex post rationalisations of gender differences in mortality and 
morbidity in the supposed absence of gender bias in expenditure allocation within the household.  For instance, they 
consider sex-bias in fertility (i.e. the fact that girls are in larger households due to parents’ going on having births till 
they get a boy, and thus having lower per capita expenditure) as an explanation for the fact that there are significant 
gender differences in outcomes such as mortality and morbidity even though there may not be any gender 
discrimination within the family in the allocation of food and medical expenditure.  In other words, they ask: if we 
believe what we find in the household expenditure methodology i.e. that there is no significant gender difference in 
consumption expenditure, then how can we explain that individual outcomes differ for girls and boys.  We are asking 
the question the other way round.  Given we know that educational outcomes differ for girls and boys, how can we 
explain that the household expenditure patterns do not pick this up. 
4 Household survey data on educational spending show that even so-called ‘fee-free’ schooling has substantial costs in 
India.  For instance, the PROBE report (Probe Team, 1999, p16) found that in rural north India, parents spend about 
Rupees 318 per year on each child who attends government (i.e. tuition-free) school, so that an agricultural labourer in 
Bihar with 3 such children would have to work for about 40 days in the year just to send them to primary school.     5 
equation  at  the  household  level  are  similar  to  those  in  an  equation  (with  as  similar a  specification  as 
possible) at the individual child level.   Section 2 discusses the methodology, including both the Engel 
curve  method and the  hurdle  model.   Section 3  discusses  data and  estimation  issues.  The results are 
discussed in Section 4 and the final section concludes. 
 
 
2.  Indirect methodology for detecting discrimination 
 
The Engel curve method utilises the fact that household composition is a variable that exerts an 
effect on household consumption patterns.  The needs that arise with additional household members act in 
such a way as to increase expenditure on items of consumption associated with the additional member.  The 
approach examines whether budget share of a good consumed by, say, children (such as education), rises as 
much when an additional girl is added to the household as it does when an additional boy is added, in a 
given age range. 
 
The approach is to estimate an Engel curve for the commodity being examined, education in the 
present case.  While there are many possible functional forms for the Engel curve linking expenditure on a 
good to total expenditure, the Working-Leser specification has the theoretical advantage of being consistent 
with a utility function and its postulation of a linear relationship between budget share of a good and the log 
of total expenditure conforms to the data in a wide range of circumstances (Deaton, 1997).    We use the 
Working-Leser specification but - so as not to pre-judge the issue - later relax it to allow for non-linearity in 
the shape of the Engel curve.  Working’s Engel curve can be extended to include household demographic 
composition by writing: 
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household size, and  i z  is a vector of other household characteristics such as religion, caste, and household 
head’s education and occupation.  i u  is the error term. The term  i n ln  allows for an independent scale 
effect for household size.   j=1,…,J refers to the Jth age-gender class within the household.    i ji n n /  is the 
fraction of household members in the jth age-gender class.  Since these fractions add up to unity, one of 
them is omitted from the regression.  In this paper, there are 14 age-sex categories.  These are males and 
females in age groups 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-60, and 61 and above. The fraction of women aged 
>=61 years old in the household is the omitted category. The variables of most interest pertain to persons of 
school-going age, i.e. they are males and females aged 5-9, 10-14, and 15-19.  These variables are named 
M5to9, F5to9, M10to14, F10to14, M15to19 and F15to19.   The  j q  coefficients represent the effects (on   6 
budget share) of changing household composition while holding household size constant, for example by 
replacing a child in a younger age group with one in an older age group, or replacing a man by a woman in 
a given age category.  Testing for gender differences simply involves testing the hypothesis that  jf jm q q =  
where the subscripts m and f are the gender groups male and female and the subscript j refers to the age-
group.  Thus, testing for gender difference in educational expenditure in the 5 to 9 age group will involve 
testing whether the coefficient on M5to9 is significantly different to the coefficient on F5to9. 
 
The above method has been used to fit the budget share equations for a wide range of commodities, 
including food items, clothing, and medical and educational expenses.  Conventionally, the model has been 
fitted on the sample of all households, irrespective of whether they incurred zero or positive expenditure on 
the particular commodity.  Much of the extant Engel Curve literature has not conditioned on zero values, 
i.e. it includes both zero and positive values of the dependant variable - the budget share.  For example, 
Subramanian  and  Deaton  (1990)  and  Subramanian  (1995)  fit  OLS  Engel  curves  on  the  sample  of  all 
households, despite the preponderance of households with zero education budget share (89% and 70% of 
households had zero education budget shares in these studies, respectively)
5.    
 
Given censoring of the dependent variable (education budget share) at zero for a large percentage 
of the sample households, an important estimation issue is the choice of the appropriate statistical model. 
While the extant literature has used OLS, in much of the applied econometrics literature, there is a well-
justified reluctance to include both zero and positive values in an OLS regression because of the biased 
estimates that result.  A standard solution often suggested is the use of a Tobit model.  However, apart from 
the potentially severe problem of heteroskedasticity (Deaton, 1997), an important limitation of the Tobit (as 
well as of the suggested alternative, namely a partially non-parametric censored Least Absolute Deviation 
or CLAD estimator) is that it assumes that a single mechanism determines the choice between s=0 versus 
s>0.  In particular,  j x x s P ¶ > ¶ / ) | 0 (  and  j x s x s E ¶ > ¶ / ) 0 , | (  are constrained to have the same sign.   
 
The alternatives to censored Tobit that allow the initial decision of s=0 versus s>0 to be separate 
from the decision of how much s is given that s>0, are called ‘hurdle models’ (Wooldridge, 2002: 536).  
These  models allow the  effect  of a variable to differently affect the  decision to  incur any  expenditure 
( 0 = s  versus  0 > s ) and how much to spend ( 0 | > s s ). The hurdle or first tier is whether or not to 
choose positive s.  In addition to estimating the conventional Engel curve equation, I propose to use hurdle 
                                                 
5 Some studies have used flexible-form or semi/non-parametric regression, for example, Bhalotra and Attfield (1998).  
In Subramanian and Deaton (1990) only 11% of rural Maharashtran households reported positive educational 
expenditures.  In Subramanian’s (1995) study using 1987-88 data, only 30% of rural Maharashtran households had 
positive spending on education. In the current NCAER data, 56% of rural Maharashtran households incurred some 
education spending.  In Subramanian (1995), in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan, 21, 56, 51 and 23 
per cent of households respectively reported positive education spending.  In the current NCAER data, the 
corresponding figures are 49, 64, 58 and 55 per cent respectively.  That is, between 1988 and 1994, the proportion of 
rural households incurring positive spending on education rose quite sharply.   7 
model  estimation to allow the  decision  of  whether to  incur any  education  expenditure to be  modelled 
separately from the decision of how much to spend on education, conditional on spending anything. 
 
A simple hurdle model can be written down as: 
) ( 1 ) | 0 ( g x x s P F - = =                 (2) 
) , ( ~ ) 0 , ( | ) log(
2 s b x Normal s x s >               (3) 
 
where s is the budget share of education, x is a vector of explanatory variables, g  and  b  are parameters to 
be estimated, and s  is the standard deviation of s.  Equation (2) stipulates the probability that s is zero or 
positive, and equation (3) states that, conditional on  0 > s ,  x s |  follows a lognormal distribution.  An 
examination of the distribution of s in Figure 1 suggests that conditional on positive education spending, s 
is more lognormally than normally distributed. 
 
The maximum likelihood estimate of g  is simply the probit estimator using s=0 versus s>0 binary 
response.    The  MLE  of  b   is  just  the  OLS  estimator  from  the  regression  of  log(s)  on  x  using  those 
observations  for  which  s>0.    A  consistent  estimator  of  s ˆ   is  the  usual  standard  error  from  the  latter 
regression.  Estimation is straightforward because we assume that, conditional on s>0, log(s) follows a 
classical linear model.  The conditional expectation of  ) 0 , | ( > s x s E  and the unconditional expectation of 
) | ( x s E  are easy to obtain using properties of the lognormal distribution: 
) 0 , | ( > s x s E     =       ) 2 / exp(
2 s b + x            (4) 
) | ( x s E     =       ) 2 / exp( ) (
2 s b g + F x x           (5) 
and these are easily estimated given  b ˆ , s ˆ , and gˆ .  The marginal effect of x on s can be obtained by 
transforming the marginal effect of x on log(s) using the exponent.  Thus, the marginal effect of x on s in 
the OLS regression of log(s) conditional on s>0 is obtained by taking the derivative of the conditional 
expectation of s with respect to x:  
x
s x s E
¶
> ¶ ) 0 , | (
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The marginal effect of a variable x on s - taking into account the effect of x on both the probability that s>0 
and  on  the  size  of  s  conditional  on  s>0  -  is  obtained  by  taking  the  derivative  of  the  unconditional 
expectation of s with respect to x.  Differentiating (5) using the product rule: 
x
x s E
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   8 
(.) f  is the standard normal density function and  (.) F  is the cumulative normal distribution function.   
 
  It is possible that  b  in the conditional OLS equation of log(s) will suffer from sample selectivity 
bias.  We are particularly concerned to see whether the coefficients on the male and female demographic 
variables such as proportion of males aged 5to9 in the household (M5to9), proportion of females aged 5to9 
(F5to9), etc. suffer from selectivity bias, as that would have implications for our measure of gender bias in 
educational spending.  If both male and female demographic variables are equally affected by selectivity 
bias,  then  there  will  be  no  under-  or  over-estimation  in  the  measurement  of  gender  bias.  However,  if 
unobserved characteristics such as child ability, child  motivation, and parental attitudes  have a  greater 
influence in enrolment decisions about daughters than sons, then sample selectivity bias in the coefficients 
of the female demographic variables will be greater than for males and this will lead to an over-estimation 
of pro-male gender bias.   
 
This can be shown by focusing on any one pair of demographic variables, e.g. M5to9 and F5to9.  
Suppose  that  a  girl’s  ability  is  an  important  unobserved  trait  that  determines  both  whether  positive 
expenditure is incurred on her schooling and how much is spent on her schooling, conditional on positive 
education spending.  Suppose that for boys ability does not matter (or matters less) to those two decisions. 
Thus, girls’ ability is an element of the error term both in the probit equation of positive education spending 
and the OLS equation of conditional education spending for girls.  Suppose that the effect of F5to9 is 
positive in both probit and conditional OLS equations, i.e. the greater the proportion of 5 to 9 year old 
females  in  the  household,  the  greater  is  the  likelihood  of  the  household  incurring  positive  education 
expenditure and the higher the conditional education expenditure (or education budget share).  Now if the 
observed F5to9 variable is very large, the household will be almost certain to incur positive education 
spending.  But suppose that on the basis of the size of the observed variable F5to9, the household is equally 
likely to have positive education spending as to have zero education spending, then the ability of girls in the 
household (unobserved to us but observed to parents) will determine whether the household has positive or 
zero education spending.  If the girls in a household have high ability, that household will be observed to 
have  positive  education  spending  and  if  they  have  low  ability,  the  household  will  not  incur  positive 
education spending.  Thus, at high values of F5to9, there is no correlation between ability and F5to9 but at 
low  levels  of  F5to9,  there  is  a  negative  correlation  between  ability  and  F5to9,  i.e.  [ ) , ( u x Corr <0].  
Averaging over all households, the correlation between the explanatory variable (F5to9) and the error term 
is not equal to zero [ 0 ) , ( ¹ u x Corr ] and in fact the correlation is negative; this implies a violation of the 
basic assumptions of the classical linear regression model and there will be endogenous sample selection 
bias.  Due to this negative correlation, the coefficient of F5to9 in the conditional OLS equation of education 
expenditure will be biased downward.  If the coefficient on the corresponding male demographic variable 
(M5to9) does not suffer from selectivity bias or suffers less from it than the female variable (as is likely), 
then any pro-male bias will be over-estimated.    9 
 
The analysis will proceed as follows.  I will estimate the marginal effect of the male and female 
demographic variables in the conventional OLS model of the budget share of education in order to compare 
my results with extant studies.  I will also estimate the marginal effects of the demographic variables in a 
hurdle model, i.e. in each of its two tiers – the binary probit of whether the household incurs positive 
education expenditure and an OLS of household education spending, conditional on spending a positive 
amount.   The  marginal  effects  will  be  computed  using  STATA. The  main  object  of  interest  is  to  see 
whether the difference in the marginal effects of the male and female demographic variables is statistically 
significant in each age-group.    
 
 
3.  Data and estimation issues 
This study utilises household survey data collected by the National Council of Applied Economic 
Research (NCAER), New Delhi.  This 1994 survey covered 33,230 households across 16 major states in 
India.  Sampling information and other details about the dataset are available in Shariff (1999). 
 
The major advantage of this dataset is its detailed information on education of each person aged 
<=35  years  in  the  household,  including  educational  expenditure  information.    However,  an  important 
drawback  is  that  it  did  not  collect  comprehensive  information  on  total  household  expenditure.    Only 
household expenditure on food, health, and education was collected.  This implies that the denominator in 
the budget share  expression  is not household total  expenditure but a (large) subset  of it, namely food, 
health, and education (FHE) expenditure
6.  The ‘missing component’ of household total expenditure is the 
non-FHE expenditure.  This would include expenditure on items such as fuel/energy, transport, housing, 
entertainment,  etc.    Given  that  we  have  data  only  on  food,  health,  and  education  (FHE),  differential 
treatment depends upon two components:  
s  =  
exp
exp
Total
Edu
  =  
exp
exp
FHE
Edu
 x  
exp
exp
Total
FHE
 
that is, it depends on: 
(i)  how 
exp
exp
FHE
Edu
 changes with more girls in the household, and 
 
(ii)  how 
exp
exp
Total
FHE
 changes with more girls in the household 
We are able to model only the first component, i.e. the share of education expenditure in FHE expenditure.  
However, the combined FHE share in total expenditure (i.e. the second component) is unlikely to rise with 
                                                 
6 We know from Subramanian’s (1995) study that in 1987-88 in five Indian states, food, health and education 
expenditure together account for about 63% of total household expenditure.    10 
the proportion of girls in the household.  If it is the case that with a greater proportion of girls in the 
household,  education  expenditure  falls  but  this  reduction  is  compensated  for  by  an  increase  in  food 
expenditure (which is the overwhelming part of FHE expenditure) then one could doubt the evidence from 
a  test  of  component  (i)  only.    However,  there  is  little  reason  to  suppose  that  FHE  expenditure  as  a 
proportion of total expenditure rises with proportion of girls in the household.  In fact, the contrary has 
often been suggested in the literature, i.e. it has been hypothesised that additional girls in the household 
decrease the share of food expenditure in total expenditure.  If the latter is true, then the evidence here 
based on component (i) only would underestimate gender bias.  We believe that additional girls in the 
household are unlikely to increase or decrease the share of food (or of FHE) expenditure in total household 
expenditure - most likely the effect is neutral
7.  In other words, modelling how the share of education in 
FHE  expenditure  changes  with  household  gender  composition  should  neither  under-  nor  over-estimate 
gender bias in the allocation of education expenditure. Thus, although we use the budget sub share of 
education in this paper, for simplicity, we refer to it simply as the budget share of education.   
 
The analysis here is limited to households which have children of school-going age, i.e. children 
aged 5 to 19 years old.  This yields a sample of 25954 households.  In this sample, the mean budget share of 
education is 4.40%
8  and the percentage of households with zero education spending is 31%.   
 
4.  Discussion of results 
We present the results in three sub-sections.  The first explores gender bias by means of descriptive 
statistics using individual-level data.  The second sub-section examines whether incorrect functional form is 
responsible for the failure of the conventional Engel curve approach to detect gender bias. The third sub-
section asks whether aggregation of data at the household level is to blame for the failure of the Engel curve 
approach to detect gender bias.    
 
                                                 
7 None of the several extant studies provides any convincing evidence of systematic gender bias in food allocation 
within Indian households.  
8 This is considerably higher than the budget share of education in previous studies on India.  For example, the average 
budget share of education for the 5 Indian states studied in Subramanian (1995) was 1.34%.  In our data, it is 3.69% 
for those same 5 states.  However, the data used in the two studies are not comparable because firstly, the earlier 
studies do not restrict the sample to only households with children in school-going age range.  Secondly, as stated 
above, our denominator is not total household expenditure (as in Subramanian) but rather a subset of it, consisting 
only of food, medical and educational expenditure.  In Subramanian’s NSS data on 5 states, these three expenditure 
items together constitute 63% of total expenditure, so it is possible to ‘adjust’ our education budget share by deflating 
it appropriately (3.69*63/100).  This yields a budget share of 2.32% for education which, though considerably higher 
than the 1.34% figure in Subramanian for the year 1987-88, is closer to the 2.87% figure for rural India in the MIMAP 
survey of the mid-1990s (Pradhan and Subramaniam, 2000, p27).  The main explanation for the fact that the budget 
share of education (s) in our data (2.32%) is greater than that in Subramanian’s study (1.34%) is that the education 
budget share has increased between 1987-88 and 1994, the reference dates of the data in the two studies.  This is 
plausible because of (i) reductions in poverty over time (Drèze and Srinivasan, 1996, p4-5; Datt and Ravallion, 1998, 
p30; Dubey and Gangopadhyay 1998), and (ii) increased demand for and more widespread supply of education.   That 
demand for education increased may be gleaned by examining changes over time in the percentage of households that 
incurred any positive educational expenditure.  Figures available for rural Maharashtra at three points in time - 1983, 
1988 and 1994 show that the percentage of households incurring positive educational expenditures rose from 11% in 
1983 to 30% in 1988 and further to 55% in 1994.    11 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
The first column of Table 1 shows the sex-ratio in the 0-14 year age group in sample households.  It 
shows that the proportion of girls is only 46.4% in rural India but also shows considerable variation across 
states with Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Assam having lower proportions of girls 
than the All-India average
9.  This gives us our prior belief that gender difference in the intra-household 
allocation of educational expenditure is likely to be strongest in these states. 
 
In the remaining columns of Table 1, we divide all households with children aged <15 years into 
two groups - ‘all-girl’ households, where all the children below age 15 are girls, and ‘at least one boy’ 
households, where there are one or more boys in the household.   Table 1 shows quite a dramatic difference 
in the percentage of households incurring positive educational spending, depending on whether it is an ‘all-
girl’ or ‘at least one boy’ household.  It shows that in rural India, the percentage of ‘all-girl’ households 
reporting positive education spending is only 47.3% whereas the corresponding percentage for ‘at least one 
boy’ households is 66.0%.  In other words, all-girl households are nearly 19 percentage points more likely 
to report zero educational spending than ‘at least one boy’ households.  This very large difference indicates 
an  important  correlation  between  the  gender-composition  of  the  household  child  population  and  the 
household’s decision to incur positive educational spending.    
 
Table  2  shows  that  in  the  age  groups  10-14  and  15-19  years,  girls  have  a  significantly  and 
substantially lower current enrolment rate (than boys), i.e. a higher probability of reporting zero educational 
spending due to non-enrolment, in virtually every one of the 16 sample states (except Kerala and West 
Bengal).  However, this is not so in the age group 5-9 where the gender gap in enrolment rate is significant 
only in about half the states.    
 
Table 3 shows average educational expenditure, conditional on enrolment.  It is clear that, once 
enrolled in school, girls and boys are not treated differently in terms of educational spending in most states 
in any of the three age-groups.  Thus, the main form of differential treatment is via differential current 
enrolment rates of girls and boys.  Table 4 includes zero education-expenditure (i.e. non-enrolled) children 
and it shows that in the 5-9 age group, the states with the greatest gender gap in unconditional educational 
expenditure are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh
10. In the 10-14 age group, the 
gender difference in unconditional education expenditure is significant in 12 of the 16 states and in the 15-
19 age group in 14 of the 16 states.  Thus, there is fairly strong evidence of gender bias in the raw data, and 
the bias is stronger in the older age groups.  The gender gap in educational expenditure occurs mainly via 
girls’  significantly  higher  probability  of  non-enrolment  (i.e.  via  zero  education  expenditures)  and  only 
rarely via lower expenditures once enrolled.   
                                                 
9 The figure for Assam seems implausibly low. 
10 While Kerala appears to have a significant gender gap in the 5-9 age range, this seems implausible.  Moreover, this 
gap becomes insignificant after controlling for household characteristics, as seen later.   12 
 
4.2  Incorrect functional form as the reason for Engel curve method’s failure to 
 detect gender bias?  
 
The conventional Engel curve equation is fitted using least squares regression on the absolute value 
of  the  household’s  unconditional  budget  share  of  education.    Thus,  the  functional  form  used  for  the 
dependant variable is linear and the analysis models both zero and positive education budget shares in a 
single equation.  As stated earlier, this is problematic.  We unpack the unconditional education budget share 
into its two components: the probability of positive budget share and, conditional on positive budget share, 
the size of budget share.  Using household level data, we estimate three equations for each state (a) the 
conventional Engel curve equation; (b) a binary probit of whether the household’s education budget share is 
positive or zero; and (c) OLS of the natural log of education budget share, conditional on positive education 
budget share. The resulting 48 equations are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
  The first column under each state in Appendix Table 1 presents the conventional Engel curve of 
education expenditure share (or ESHARE) fitted on all zero and positive education expenditure households.  
This is the unconditional OLS of ESHARE.   
 
The budget share of education varies from 2.7% in Andhra Pradesh to 8.7% in Himachal Pradesh. 
The  goodness  of  fit  of  the  conventional  Engel  curves  varies  substantially  by  state.   The  shape  of  the 
education Engel curve was non-linear in several states when I allowed for a quadratic term in LNPCE, 
confirming that at low levels of per capita expenditure, education is a luxury but that it becomes a necessity 
at higher levels of expenditure
11. 
 
Per capita expenditure has a significant positive impact on budget share of education, and the total 
expenditure elasticity is close to or above unity in all states, suggesting that education is treated as a luxury.  
The elasticities are mostly lower than those found in Subramanian and Deaton (1990) and Subramanian 
(1995), suggesting that education has come to be treated as less of a luxury than in the mid-1980s (date of 
data in previous studies)
 12. 
 
                                                 
11 I report the specification using log of per capita expenditure (LNPCE) on the right hand side but I also tried two 
variations: one was to include LNPCI (log of per capita income) instead.  The other was an instrumental variable 
estimation, using LNPCI to instrument LNPCE. Using LNPCI as an instrument for LNPCE is justified because the two 
are highly correlated and because income will not be correlated with budget shares independently of its correlation 
with LNPCE. The coefficients of the household demographic variables (M5to9, F5to9, M10to14, etc.) and the F-tests 
of the significance of the gender gaps in educational expenditure were very robust to these alternative formulations.  
12 In Subramanian’s study the total expenditure elasticities for AP, Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab and Rajasthan were 
2.14, 1.13, 1.79, 1.58, and 1.75 respectively.  When we repeat our analysis to resemble Subramanian’s, i.e. this time 
including households without children of school-going age, our estimated elasticities for the 5 states are: 1.49, 1.41, 
1.19, 1.17 and 1.08 respectively.  That is, except for Haryana, the elasticities for the other four states are very 
considerably lower than in Subramanian (1995).   13 
The  effect  of  household  size  is  positive  and  significant  in  every  state.    This  is  in  line  with 
theoretical considerations which suggest that, at any given level of per capita resources, larger households 
will be better off due to economies of scale that accrue from shared household public goods.  The finding of 
a positive and consistent effect of household size is of particular interest given the failure to find this effect 
in the seven high and low income countries studied in Deaton and Paxson (1998). 
 
  Household head’s schooling (HEDYRS) increases the budget share of education very significantly 
across  all  sample  states,  indicating  a  higher  ‘taste’/demand  for  child  schooling  among  more  educated 
households.    The effects of caste and occupation are generally not significant or consistent across states.  
However, religion matters.  Even after controls for household per capita expenditure and head’s education, 
MUSLIM households have significantly lower education budget sub-shares than Hindus and Sikhs (the 
omitted category) in Haryana, HP, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, UP, WB, and Assam.   The parameters of the 
gender- and age-composition variables (M5to9, F5to9, M10to14, etc.) show that education budget share 
generally increases with proportion of male and female children of school-going age within the household.   
 
  What does the fitted conventional Engel curve in each state tell us about gender bias in the within-
household allocation of educational expenditure?  P-values of the F-test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the male and female demographic variables are equal are presented in the last three rows of 
Appendix Table 1.  The row for ‘p-value: age 5 to 9’ of the first columns under each state shows that in the 
5-9 age group, the hypothesis that the coefficient on M5to9 (the male demographic variable for age group 5 
to 9) is the same as the coefficient on F5to9 (the female demographic variable for age group 5 to 9) is 
rejected at the 5% significance level only for Rajasthan.  This lack of evidence of significant gender bias in 
all but one state shows that the conventional Engel curve technique is not good at picking up gender-
differentiated  treatment  in  educational  expenditure  within  households,  given  that  enrolment  data  show 
significant gender differences in 9 out of the 16 states (Table 2).   
 
Next, in attempting to examine why the Engel curve method fails to detect gender bias, I unpack 
total household education budget share into its two underlying components using the hurdle model outlined 
earlier.  The second and third columns under each state in Appendix Table 1 present equations respectively 
for: (a) the probability that the household budget share of education is positive (the probit equation of 
ANYEDEXP),  and  (b)  the  natural  log  of  education  budget  share,  conditional  on  positive  spending 
(conditional OLS equation).  In the conditional budget share equation, sample selection could be a problem. 
However, as explained in the methodology section, the conditional OLS equation will tend to over-estimate 
any pro-male bias. We attempted to control for sample selectivity but its effects were largely insignificant
13.   
                                                 
13 We allowed for sample selectivity using ‘index of productive assets owned by household’ as the exclusion 
restriction for identifying the constructed variable Lambda.  Index of productive assets (INDEXPA) seemed a good 
exclusion restriction in that, for each age group (5-9, 10-14, 15-19), INDEXPA was significant in the probit of current 
enrolment and insignificant in the educational expenditure function.  One would expect this a priori since the presence 
of productive assets would be likely to raise the opportunity cost of school attendance by increasing the returns to   14 
 
In Appendix Table 1, it is conspicuous in the second and third columns under each state that some 
variables have opposing effects on the two outcomes.  For example, the effect of log of household per 
capita expenditure (LNPCE) is invariably positive and highly significant in the probit of ANYEDEXP in all 
states but it is almost invariably negative and highly significant in the conditional OLS of budget share.  As 
per Engel’s law, this is as expected. While the household size variable (LNHHSIZE) has a large positive 
and  significant  effect  on  the  probability  of  spending  a  positive  sum  on  education,  its  effect  on  the 
conditional budget share is small and typically insignificant
14.   
 
Of most interest, from the point of view of the central question about gender bias, is the impact, on 
the  two  outcomes,  of  the  demographic  variables  M5to9,  F5to9  (household’s  proportion  of  males  and 
females aged 5 to 9); M10to14, F10to14 (proportion of males and females aged 10 to 14); and M15to19 and 
F15to19 (proportion of males and females aged 15 to 19).  To investigate this impact, we compute the 
marginal  effects  of  the  male  and  female  demographic  variables  in  each  equation  and  then  take  the 
difference between the male and female marginal effects.  For example, in any given equation, the marginal 
effect of the variable ‘M5to9’ minus the marginal effect of the variable ‘F5to9’ is the difference in marginal 
effect (DME) of the gender variables in age group 5-9.   
 
  Tables 5a, 5b and 5c present the difference in marginal effects (DME) of the demographic variables 
for the 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 age groups respectively, calculated from the results in Appendix Table 1.  The 
figures in parentheses below each DME are the p-values of the F-test that the DME is equal to zero.  P-
values of statistically significant DME’s (at the 5% level or better) are shaded.  The meaning of the DME is 
best illustrated with an example. For instance, in the probit of ANYEDEXP in Gujarat in Appendix Table 1, 
the marginal effect of the variable M5to9 was 0.4867 and the marginal effect of F5to9 was 0.0712.  Thus 
the gender DME in the 5-9 age group there was 0.4155.  Table 5a shows this difference multiplied by 100, 
i.e. as 41.55.  The p-value  of the F-test that this difference  is  equal to zero  was 0.04, i.e. this gender 
difference in marginal effect is statistically significant at the 4% level.  In Tables 5a, 5b and 5c, the probit 
results in column (a) refer to male-female DME from the probit of whether the household had a positive 
education budget share.  Column (b) refers to the male-female DME in the conditional OLS of the log of 
                                                                                                                                                          
child labour.  However, once a child is in school, productive assets should not matter to how much the household 
spends on the education of the child since we control for household per capita expenditure.  The selectivity variable 
Lambda was significant at the 5% level (p value 0.043, t=2.02) only in the 10-14 age group but even there, there was 
no significant difference in the coefficients of the OLS and selectivity corrected equations. In the age-groups 5-9, 10-
14, and 15-19, the t-values on lambda were -0.44,  2.02, and -1.69 respectively.  INDEXPA turned out not to be a 
good identifying exclusion restriction when doing the regressions by state, since it was frequently insignificant in the 
current enrolment probit and occasionally significant in the educational expenditure function.  It is possible that with 
better identifying exclusion restrictions, we could achieve better identification of lambda and so the OLS coefficient 
on MALE should be taken as the lower bound on the effect of MALE.  We also tried CLAD estimates (available from 
author) but these were not significantly different to OLS estimates. 
14 The marginal effects of the demographic variables are sometimes above 1 because these variables take values from 
0 to 1 rather than from 1 to 100.  Redefining them to be bounded by 1 and 100 simply leads to the reported marginal 
effects being divided by 100.   15 
education budget share (ESHARE). Since the dependent variable here is in logs, the marginal effects of the 
male and female  demographic variables  were transformed before taking  differences, so that the DMEs 
reported in column (b) are comparable to those in column (d), where the dependent variable was absolute 
ESHARE
15.   Column (c) shows the DME of the combined marginal effects from the probit and conditional 
OLS equations, the combined marginal effect having been derived in the way shown in equation 7.  Column 
(d) pertains to the unconditional OLS results, i.e. the OLS of the absolute budget share of education fitted 
on all (including zero education expenditure) households – the commonly reported Engel curve equation.   
 
  Tables 5a, 5b and 5c demonstrate two interesting facts. Firstly that DME is almost always 
positive in the probit. That is, in most cases, having an extra boy in the household has a greater positive 
impact on the probability of having ANYEDEXP than having an extra girl in the household.  Secondly, it 
shows that the gender DME is often negative in the conditional OLS in the 5-9 and 10-14 age groups 
(though not in the 15-19 group).  Thus, in the basic-education age group (5-14) in many states, there is 
slight pro-female bias in conditional education budget share: having an extra girl in the household increases 
the conditional household budget share of education more than having an extra boy in the household.   This 
could be because certain costs of girls’ education are somewhat greater than those for boys
16. 
 
In  the  5  to  9  age  group,  the  gender  DME  in  the  probit  is  positive  for  all  states  except  one 
(Karnataka), and is statistically significant in six states.  In 10 out of 16 states the gender DME in the 
conditional OLS of LNESHARE is negative (albeit insignificant), and in only one of the 16 states is it 
positive and statistically significant, i.e. in the vast majority of states there is no pro-male gender bias in 
conditional education expenditure.  The inference from the ‘conventional’ Engel curve results in column (d) 
is that there is no significant gender bias in education expenditure in the 5-9 age group in any state other 
than Rajasthan.  However, such an inference masks the fact that in 5 states other than Rajasthan, there is 
significant gender bias in the decision whether to enrol a child in school.  To overlook the difference is to 
miss an important discriminatory process. 
 
  In the 10-14 age group, the gender DME in the probit is positive for all states except Kerala and 
West Bengal, and it is significant in 7 states.  But the DME from the conditional OLS is insignificant in all 
but one state.  Here too, as in the 5-9 age group, the conventional Engel curve result in column (d) would 
                                                 
15 For example, the coefficient on the variable M5to9 in the conditional OLS of LNESHARE for Gujarat is –1.58 and 
the coefficient on F5to9 is –1.08.  The log transforms of these are obtained by using the property of the lognormal 
distribution that the conditional expectation of  ) 0 , | ( > s x s E  equals  ) 2 / exp(
2 s b + x .  For the Exp(.) is equal to 
0.04836.  Thus the marginal effect of M5to9 is b*exp(.), i.e. it is –1.58*0.04836 = -0.0766 ; the marginal effect of 
F5to9 is –1.08*0.04836 = -0.0524.  Thus, the gender difference in marginal effect for the 5-9 age group in Gujarat in 
the conditional OLS of budget share (as opposed to the log of budget share) is –0.0766 – -0.0524 = -0.0242.  In Table 
5 all (differences in) marginal effects are multiplied by 100, so this appears as -2.42. 
16 For instance, girls’ school clothes may cost more since girls should be well covered.  However, there is no 
consistent evidence of systematically greater expenditure on girls than boys in particular education expenditure 
categories.  In the questionnaire, tuition fee and school uniform are lumped together in one category so we cannot 
check if more is spent on girls’ school uniform than on boys’.  In the 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 age groups, mean transport 
costs are higher for girls than boys in only 3, 5 and 6 of the 16 states respectively.     16 
lead to the  inference  of  no significant  gender bias in any state  other than Rajasthan.   Again, such an 
inference  would  neglect  the  fact  that  in  6  states  other  than  Rajasthan,  there  is  significant  bias  in  the 
enrolment decision.  Table 5b also shows that using the hurdle model approach (column c), 5 states have 
significant gender bias in unconditional education expenditure.  In other words, when the decision to incur 
positive education expenditure is modelled separately from the decision how much to spend conditional on 
positive expenditure (using appropriate functional forms), we are more successful in ‘picking up’ gender 
bias in education spending than with the conventional Engel approach which imposes linear regression of 
unconditional education expenditure.  
 
In the 15-19 age group, both the DME in the probit and the DME in the conditional OLS are 
typically positive (significant only in 10 states in the probit and in 6 states in the conditional OLS).  Thus, 
unlike in the case of the 5-9 and 10-14 age groups, here both the probit and conditional OLS results mostly 
work in the same direction, i.e. they reinforce each other.   
 
In order to show graphically that the two processes of gender differentiation are different, I present 
a scatter plot of the DMEs separately for the three age groups in Figure 2.  If the two processes were the 
same, we would expect all the points to fall on the diagonal 45 degree line through the origin.  It is clear in 
Figure 2 that for youngest two age groups (denoted age=1 and age=2 in Figure 2), there is little suggestion 
that the states are on the upward diagonal.  Indeed if anything, the points appear to lie on the downward 
diagonal.  However, for the 15-19 year olds (denoted age=3), except for a few states such as Assam, Bihar 
and Himachal Pradesh (denoted by as, bi, and hp respectively), most of the other states lie roughly on the 
positive diagonal.  In other words, below the age of 15, the two processes oppose each other but beyond age 
15, they reinforce each other.   
 
It  is  not  clear  what  explains  the  lack  of  significant  gender  difference  in  conditional  education 
expenditure in the primary and junior age groups but its presence in the secondary school age group.  One 
possibility might be that gender differentiated treatment in conditional education expenditure only begins at 
the secondary school stage because at that stage children are closer to further education courses and to 
employment.  However, at the secondary school stage, there may be supply-side reasons for not interpreting 
lower conditional educational expenditure on girls necessarily as evidence of parental discrimination.  By 
the  early  1990s,  state  provided  elementary  education  was  tuition  free  but  certain  states  operated  an 
affirmative  action  policy  for  girls  in  the  secondary  school  stage  by  providing  tuition-free  secondary 
schooling
17.  Thus, in these states, lower conditional education expenditure on girls cannot be taken as 
evidence of parental bias against girls.  Moreover, the dearth of (and distance to) single-sex girls’ secondary 
schools may deter parents from sending girls to school for safety and social reasons, rather than for reasons 
                                                 
17 Bihar, Haryana, Himachal, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan and Assam provided free access to secondary education 
for girls.   17 
of discrimination; thus it is difficult to know what part of girls’ observed inferior enrolment outcomes in the 
15-19 age range is due to parental discrimination and what due to supply-side factors. 
 
To sum up, the discussion so far suggests two conclusions.  Firstly, that the Engel curve approach 
does not pick up gender bias partly because it uses the wrong functional form.  It estimates a single budget 
share equation to encompass two different decisions: the binary decision of whether to make a purchase and 
the decision, conditional on purchase, of how much to spend on the good.  If the correct functional form for 
the binary decision is non-linear and the correct distribution of conditional expenditure is lognormal rather 
than normal, then a hurdle model seems better able to capture gender biases in unconditional expenditure. 
Secondly, the discussion shows the importance of ‘unpacking’ the total gender difference in expenditure 
into its two constituent parts – the difference due to a greater incidence of zero purchases for girls than boys 
and the  difference  due to  lower conditional  expenditures  on  girls than boys – so as to avoid  lumping 
together two different (often divergent) processes.  Averaging over the two dilutes the effect of the former 
difference, which is clearly the main discriminatory process.  While averaging may lead to the conclusion 
of no pro-male bias, there is evidence of significant pro-male bias in one of the processes, and policy 
makers may be as concerned with the distribution of educational expenditure for girls and boys as with its 
average.  Indeed it is possible that for children’s long term life chances, being in school is more important 
than expenditure on schooling once enrolled. 
 
4.3  Aggregation as the reason for Engel curve method’s failure to detect gender bias?  
 
We turn next to examine whether aggregation of data at the household level makes it more difficult 
to  detect  gender  differences  in  educational  expenditure  than  when  using  individual  child  level  data.  
Individual  level  expenditure  provides  the  most  reliable  way  of  detecting  gender  bias.    As  we  have 
educational expenditure information at the level of the individual child and also, by aggregation, at the level 
of  the  household,  it  is  possible  to  compare  household  level  Engel  curve  results  with  individual  level 
analysis.  In the individual level analysis, the dependant variable is education expenditure on the individual 
child (rather than household budget share of education).  Moreover, instead of demographic variables such 
as ‘household proportion of males aged 5 to 9’ and ‘household proportion of females aged 5 to 9’, etc., the 
gender variable of interest is simply the dummy variable MALE which is 1 for males and 0 for females. 
The rest of the explanatory variables in the individual level equations are identical to those in the household 
equations of Appendix Table 1, i.e. they are household level variables.  The three age groups of interest, as 
before, are ages 5 to 9, ages 10 to 14 and ages 15 to 19, corresponding roughly with primary, junior and 
secondary education.  
 
At the individual child level, we estimated 144 separate equations (16 states x 3 age groups x 3 
equations). We do not display all 144 equations but the marginal effects on the gender variable MALE from   18 
these equations are presented in Table 6a (for age group 5 to 9), Table 6b (for age group 10-14) and Table 
6c (for age group 15-19). 
 
The marginal effects on MALE in Tables 6a, 6b and 6c are not comparable with the difference in 
marginal effects of the household demographic variables in Tables 5a, 5b and 5c.  This is because the 
household demographic variables in a household level regression are not identical to the dummy variable 
MALE in the individual level regression.  It is also because the dependant variable in the conditional and 
unconditional  OLS  equations  in  Table  6  is  education  expenditure  but  in  Table  5  the  corresponding 
dependant variable is education budget share.  Thus, the scaling of the coefficients and marginal effects will 
be different in the two Tables.  However, we are interested mainly in whether any statistically significant 
gender differences in the individual level Table 6 are also significant in the household level Table 5. 
 
The individual level results of Tables 6 confirm what we saw earlier, namely that in each of the 
three age-groups, much of the gender differentiated treatment occurs at the stage of the decision whether to 
even incur positive education expenditure (enrol a child in school), and not in the decision of how much to 
spend,  conditional  on  school  enrolment.    In  several  instances,  the  marginal  effect  of  MALE  in  the 
conditional  expenditure  equation  is  negative,  i.e.  girls  have  somewhat  higher  education  expenditure, 
conditional on being in school, though this pro-female bias is rarely statistically significant. 
 
  Since MALE is a discrete variable, the marginal effect of MALE in the combined hurdle model 
(column c) is estimated by calculating the expected values of unconditional expenditure in equation (5) with 
MALE=1  and  with  MALE=0  and  then  taking  the  difference,  rather  than  by  taking  derivatives,  as  in 
equation  (7)
  18.    Column  (d)  presents  the  marginal  effect  of  the  variable  MALE  in  the  unconditional 
expenditure equation, i.e. the single OLS equation estimated including zero education expenditures.   
 
While a comparison of columns (c) and (d) shows quite good correspondence between the two, the 
hurdle model is still more effective at picking up gender bias than the conventional unconditional OLS 
model.  For example, in Table 6a, the hurdle model detects overall gender bias in Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu where the unconditional OLS fails to pick it up.  The same is true for Assam in Tables 6b, 6c. 
 
The  most  noteworthy  fact  to  emerge  from  a  comparison  of  Tables  5  and  6  is  that  the  gender 
difference in education expenditure is statistically significant in many more states when individual level 
data is used (Tables 6) than when household aggregated data is used (Tables 5).  This may be taken to 
suggest that there is something in the aggregation that makes it more difficult to pick up gender differences 
in expenditure.  However, when comparing Tables 5 and 6 one is not comparing like with like.  While we 
                                                 
18 However, when we estimated the marginal effects of the continuous gender variables M5to9 and F5to9 etc. in the 
Engel curve equation using household level data earlier in the paper, we used derivatives as set out in equations (6) 
and (7).     19 
have ensured that in all other respects the specification of the probit, conditional OLS and unconditional 
OLS equations are identical in the individual and household level analyses, the dependant variables (except 
in the probit) as well as the gender variables are different in the individual and household level analyses.  In 
order to compare like with like, one would need to use a similar gender variable in the household level 
analysis as the MALE dummy variable in the individual level analysis.   
 
Since gender bias manifests itself mainly in the zero versus positive expenditure (ANYEDEXP) 
decision, we examine whether the effect of gender is similar in the individual and household level probits of 
ANYEDEXP.  Table 7 compares the marginal effects of gender in the individual and household level probit 
equations that are as alike as we could make them.  Column (1) reproduces the marginal effect of MALE in 
the individual level probits (taken from the first columns of Tables 6a, 6b, and 6c).  Columns (2) presents 
the marginal effects of gender variables in the household level probit, the three gender variables being: 
‘proportion of males among all 5-9 year olds in the household’; ‘proportion of males among all 10-14 year 
olds in the household’; and ‘proportion of males among all 15-19 year olds in the household’.  These 
gender variables at the household level differ from those used so far in that they represent the proportion of 
males within a given age group (e.g. number of males aged 5 to 9 divided by number of males and females 
aged 5 to 9 in the family) rather than, for example, proportion of males aged 5 to 9 within the household as 
a whole.  This is the gender concept that comes closest to the gender dummy MALE in the individual level 
regression. Since both individual and household level gender variables are now bounded between 0 and 1, 
their marginal effects should be comparable.  
 
Table  7  shows  that  at  conventional  levels  of  significance,  household  level  data  fails  to  detect 
significant  discrimination  in  about  11  (or  about  one-third  of)  cases  where  individual  level  data  shows 
significant bias.  We can also compare the sizes of the marginal effects of gender across the individual and 
household probits.  Such a comparison shows that even when we have done the best we can to achieve 
similar explanatory and dependant variables in individual and household level equations, we still fail to 
capture the full extent of gender bias when we use household level data.  The marginal effect of the gender 
variable is consistently and significantly lower in the household level probit than in the individual level 
probit in each of the three age groups. The average marginal effect of gender in each age group is presented 
in the last row of Table 7 and depicted in Figure 3.  It shows that the marginal effect of the gender variable 
increases with age group and, within each age group, is always higher in individual level data than in 
household level data. This suggests that there is something about aggregation that prevents household level 
data from picking up the full extent of gender bias.  It is not that measurement error is greater in household 
total education expenditure than in individual education expenditure, since in the dataset used for this study, 
household education expenditure is obtained by aggregating individual education expenditure.   
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5.  Conclusion 
  The individual level data on educational expenditures confirm that (i) in Indian states with the most 
skewed sex-ratios, educational outcomes such as school enrolment rates for girls are significantly worse 
than  those  for  boys.    They  also  confirm  that  (ii)  in  those  Indian  states  where  there  is  evidence  of 
significantly worse educational outcomes for girls than boys, household expenditure on girls’ education is 
indeed significantly lower than that on boys’, i.e, lower educational inputs are an important mechanism by 
which girls’ educational outcomes turn out to be inferior than boys’.  The data show that the most important 
way in which gender bias in educational resource allocation manifests itself in rural Indian households is 
via  non-enrolment  of  girls,  which  implies  zero  educational  spending.    There  is  little  gender  bias  in 
educational expenditure among enrolled children.   
 
The  analysis  shows  a  low  degree  of  correspondence  between  results  in  individual  level  and 
household level data; particularly in the younger two age groups the household expenditure method fails to 
find significant discrimination.  Our approach in this paper suggests important explanations for why the 
conventional Engel method fails to detect gender bias in intra-household allocation.  Tests suggest that this 
failure is partly because the Engel curve method as conventionally applied suffers from incorrect functional 
form and the  limitation that the  effects of the  household  gender composition  variables  on both (a) the 
decision to enrol in school and (b) the decision of how much to spend - conditional on enrolling - are 
constrained to be in the same direction.  Our data suggest that the effects are in divergent directions in a 
substantial number of cases in the primary and junior school age groups.  However, in the 15-19 year age 
group, these two effects work in the same direction and tend to reinforce each other.  Thus, it is only in this 
group that results from the Engel curve method correspond well with the results from the direct inspection 
of individual level expenditure.   Given that the two processes of discrimination often diverge, neither the 
unconditional OLS nor the tobit are appropriate modelling strategies.  The hurdle model has greater power 
to detect discrimination. 
 
The results also suggest that aggregation of data at the household level makes it more difficult to 
pick up gender differences.  Even when individual and household level variables and equations are made as 
similar as possible, household level equations consistently fail to capture the full extent of the gender bias.  
This  suggests  that  aggregation  of  data  does  prevent  the  household  expenditure  method  from  detecting 
gender bias, and this is not due to measurement error in the household expenditure variable.  We are left 
with the conclusion that for those concerned with reliably measuring the extent of gender discrimination in 
household expenditure allocation, household level data is a poor substitute for individual level expenditure 
data. Household expenditure data is of some use providing one models the hurdle but it still understates the 
extent of the problem of gender discrimination. 
 
  The results here highlight that there are two distinct processes by which gender bias occurs in the 
within-household allocation of educational expenditure.  Thus, a method that integrates/jointly models these   21 
two  processes  dilutes  the  powerful  gender-differentiation  that  exists  in  many  states  in  the  main 
discriminatory mechanism, namely the non-enrolment of girls.  It is possible that this is also the reason why 
no significant or consistent evidence of gender bias has been detected in medical expenditures in India 
(Subramanian and Deaton, 1990; Subramanian, 1995).  It is fairly plausible to imagine scenarios whereby 
parents  delay  seeking  medical  care  for  girls  compared  with  for  boys  in  the  same  state  of  illness  but, 
conditional on seeking medical advice, the expenditure on girls is the same as that on boys.  Policy makers 
may be as or even more concerned with the former source of bias since it may be more important for 
children’s longer term life chances. 
   
  Our discussion also points out the need to consider the supply-side when investigating household 
expenditures on particular commodities.  If certain facilities and institutions (such as schools or health 
clinics) are not locally available and there are social taboos or difficulties about girls’ use of non-local 
facilities, or if there are affirmative action policies in place for girls’ health or their participation in certain 
levels of education, household expenditures on girls may be lower not due to parental discrimination per se 
but rather due to these supply side conditions. 
 
  While our data show very significantly lower educational allocations to girls than boys in rural 
India, explanations underlying these differential allocations are not explored here.  Gender-differentiated 
treatment could be due to son preference or due to an investment motive. The investment motive attributes 
unequal allocations to the differential returns of girls and boys, or differential returns accruing to parents.  
Differential returns  may arise from  dowry,  different  labour returns of  males and females, or patrilocal 
family structure (Rose, 2000).  Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) find that where there are economic returns to 
women’s human capital, parents do invest in girls’ education. Estimates for urban India suggest that women 
face lower economic returns to education than men (Kingdon, 1998)
19.  Further evidence on returns to men 
and women’s education in the rural Indian labour market would be useful in analysing whether gender bias 
in intra-household educational resource allocation in rural India is attributable to gender differentials in the 
returns to education. 
                                                 
19 Duraisamy (2002) and Kingdon and Unni (2001) find mixed evidence on returns to men and women’s education in 
India.  However, neither study could control for omitted family background bias, which substantially reduces women’s 
returns but not men’s in Kingdon (1998). Indian estimates in Kingdon (1998) do not conform to the worldwide pattern 
that returns to women’s education are generally higher than those to men’s (Schultz, 1993).   22 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics, by State 
 
STATE 
 
 
 
Proportion of 
girls  
in all children  
(aged 0-14)  
 
Proportion of  
‘all-girl’ 
households in 
all households 
 
% of ‘at-least- 
one-boy’ 
households that 
incurred 
positive 
education 
expenditure  
% of ‘all-girl’ 
households 
that incurred 
positive 
education 
expenditure 
Percentage 
point 
difference 
(d) - (e) 
 
t-value of the 
difference  
in (d) and (e) 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g) 
ANDRHA  48.1  25.6  62.8  48.9  13.9  4.8 
             
BIHAR  44.7  17.1  56.3  43.2  13.1  4.3 
             
GUJARAT  45.9  17.8  62.9  42.6  20.3  5.5 
             
HARYANA  46.3  15.5  72.4  52.2  20.2  5.7 
             
HIMACHAL  46.8  19.1  85.4  69.6  15.8  4.3 
             
KARNATAK  47.6  20.6  72.1  59.0  13.1  4.9 
             
KERALA  50.2  28.9  72.1  58.7  13.4  4.2 
             
MAHARASH  46.3  19.2  69.2  48.3  20.9  7.8 
             
MADHYA  46.4  18.5  61.1  42.3  18.8  8.6 
             
ORISSA  48.4  21.1  64.7  44.0  20.7  6.7 
             
PUNJAB  46.4  17.7  70.5  46.5  24.0  6.0 
             
RAJASTHAN  45.0  15.0  67.9  32.3  35.6  11.1 
             
TAMILNADU  48.7  28.5  60.1  39.5  20.6  6.2 
             
UTTAR  44.8  15.0  66.9  44.1  22.8  9.6 
             
W.BENGAL  49.2  20.4  60.2  42.8  17.4  5.1 
             
ASSAM  39.6  12.2  62.4  55.6  6.8  1.5 
             
INDIA  46.4  19.0  66.0  47.3  18.7  24.4 
 
Note:  Shaded cells represent cells with values above or below the national average.  The figures for Assam in the first 
two columns are implausibly low.  The states with the greatest expected gender bias are Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Maharashtra, Madhya, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. 
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Table 2 
Current enrolment rate of children, by age-group and gender 
 
State  Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
  female  male  gap  female  male  gap  female  male  gap 
ANDRHA  65  77  12  57  70  13  15  40  25 
                   
BIHAR  35  46  11  50  64  14  24  46  22 
                   
GUJARAT  57  65  8  68  82  14  24  44  20 
                   
HARYANA  55  60  5  70  85  15  21  49  28 
                   
HIMACHAL  79  83  4  89  94  5  46  74  28 
                   
KARNATAK  60  64  4  64  74  10  27  44  23 
                   
KERALA  81  85  4  98  96  - 2  54  55  1 
                   
MAHARASH  69  70  1  71  85  14  26  56  30 
                   
MADHYA  40  47  7  52  69  17  15  42  27 
                   
ORISSA  51  58  7  56  76  20  18  42  24 
                   
PUNJAB  71  76  5  73  83  10  26  45  19 
                   
RAJASTHAN  32  58  26  36  79  43  9  46  37 
                   
TAMILNADU  61  74  13  67  80  13  23  38  15 
                   
UTTAR  40  56  16  49  72  23  19  47  28 
                   
W.BENGAL  47  48  1  62  66  4  25  40  15 
                   
ASSAM  52  60  8  77  86  9  49  59  10 
                   
INDIA  51  60  9  60  76  16  24  47  23 
 
Note: The shaded cells represent statistically significant gender-gaps, at the 5% level.   26 
Table 3 
Educational expenditure on ENROLLED children, by age-group and gender 
 
  Age 5 - 9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
  girls  boys  t  girls  boys  t  girls  boys  t 
ANDRHA  258  219  -1.0  305  330  0.5  864  885  0.1 
                   
BIHAR  249  309  2.1  378  431  1.4  651  652  0.0 
                   
GUJARAT  258  247  -0.3  313  350  1.0  912  1171  1.5 
                   
HARYANA  633  634  0.0  721  859  2.3  1115  1434  2.6 
                   
HIMACHAL  671  707  0.6  974  1049  1.2  1686  1966  1.9 
                   
KARNATAK  285  337  1.3  446  455  0.2  751  918  1.8 
                   
KERALA  490  611  2.7  677  745  1.3  1269  1373  0.8 
                   
MAHARASH  210  222  1.1  359  397  1.7  688  786  1.7 
                   
MADHYA  218  242  1.6  301  289  -0.7  651  582  -1.1 
                   
ORISSA  222  188  -1.6  295  289  -0.3  852  831  -0.2 
                   
PUNJAB  498  651  2.3  674  793  2.0  1712  1365  -2.0 
                   
RAJASTHAN  324  348  1.0  496  520  0.8  1109  1164  0.4 
                   
TAMILNADU  333  331  -0.0  386  418  0.6  1069  910  -0.8 
                   
UTTAR  343  316  -1.0  375  411  1.8  710  780  1.0 
                   
W.BENGAL  200  204  0.1  382  379  -0.1  863  945  0.8 
                   
ASSAM  357  353  -0.1  352  449  2.2  905  1007  0.6 
                   
INDIA  331  345  1.5  455  477  2.2  981  994  0.4 
 
Note: The shaded cells represent statistically significant gender-gaps, at the 5% level.     27 
 
Table 4 
Educational expenditure on all (enrolled and non-enrolled) children, by age-group and gender 
 
  Age 5 - 9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
  girls  boys  t  girls  boys  t  girls  boys  t 
ANDRHA  168  168  0.0  174  232  1.7  130  355  4.9 
                   
BIHAR  88  142  4.1  191  275  3.4  153  302  5.0 
                   
GUJARAT  147  160  0.5  212  288  2.6  215  514  4.6 
                   
HARYANA  348  378  0.9  503  731  4.5  236  703  8.7 
                   
HIMACHAL  528  586  1.2  872  989  2.0  780  1458  6.3 
                   
KARNATAK  171  218  1.8  284  339  1.7  199  406  5.2 
                   
KERALA  399  520  2.9  662  718  1.1  679  758  0.9 
                   
MAHARASH  144  154  1.2  254  339  4.6  180  438  8.4 
                   
MADHYA  86  113  3.5  156  200  4.0  99  247  8.6 
                   
ORISSA  112  109  0.3  165  219  3.1  155  351  5.0 
                   
PUNJAB  352  491  2.7  495  660  3.2  449  611  2.2 
                   
RAJASTHAN  104  202  7.6  176  410  11.4  95  540  9.8 
                   
TAMILNADU  204  244  1.0  259  336  1.9  248  348  1.4 
                   
UTTAR  137  176  2.9  182  297  8.6  136  368  9.4 
                   
W.BENGAL  95  99  0.3  235  249  0.6  212  376  3.8 
                   
ASSAM  186  210  0.9  271  387  3.0  444  593  1.5 
                   
INDIA  170  206  6.6  274  364  12.1  234  468  19.5 
 
Note: The shaded cells represent statistically significant gender-gaps, at the 5% level. 
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 Table 5a 
Difference in Marginal Effect (DME) x 100 of gender variables male5-9 and female5-9,  
and p-value of the associated t-test 
(Household-level results) 
 
State  Probit  
 
 
(a) 
Conditional  
OLS 
 
(b) 
Combined  
probit+OLS  
 
 (c) = f(a,b) 
Unconditional OLS  
(Conventional 
Engel curve) 
(d) 
         
AP  60.09  -1.38  1.67  -0.03 
  (.00)  (.41)  (.24)  (.98) 
         
BIH  24.53  -0.73  1.00  0.40 
  (.10)  (.73)  (.54)  (.76) 
         
GUJ  41.55  -2.42  0.31  0.30 
  (.04)  (.34)  (.87)  (.87) 
         
HAR  10.41  3.78  3.95  3.17 
  (.49)  (.11)  (.11)  (.11) 
         
HIM  11.79  -2.71  -1.48  0.93 
  (.25)  (.37)  (.62)  (.72) 
         
KAR  -1.94  -2.03  -1.67  -0.31 
  (.88)  (.30)  (.32)  (.83) 
         
KER  11.02  2.86  3.71  3.65 
  (.10)  (.22)  (.11)  (.12) 
         
MAH  17.24  -2.30  -0.82  0.56 
  (.18)  (.17)  (.61)  (.68) 
         
MP  14.50  -0.55  0.31  0.60 
  (.19)  (.66)  (.75)  (.45) 
         
ORI  70.57  -2.68  1.00  0.23 
  (.00)  (.07)  (.40)  (.86) 
         
PUN  30.46  2.70  4.11  2.85 
  (.11)  (.46)  (.24)  (.20) 
         
RAJ  40.86  3.34  4.32  4.10 
  (.00)  (.03)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
TN  50.96  1.26  3.50  2.93 
  (.01)  (.59)  (.08)  (.11) 
         
UP  32.99  -0.58  1.31  1.55 
  (.00)  (.64)  (.19)  (.11) 
         
WB  18.82  -0.18  0.62  0.77 
  (.30)  (.92)  (.66)  (.58) 
         
ASS  5.33  2.62  2.46  -0.12 
  (.73)  (.24)  (.25)  (.94) 
         
 
Note:  In the conditional OLS equation fitted only for households with positive education spending, the dependant variable is the 
natural log of the household education budget share. Thus, the coefficients of the gender dummy variables were transformed so that 
the marginal effects reported in column (b) are comparable to those in column (d), where the dependent variable is in absolute 
rather than log terms.   Column (d) pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute household education budget share, fitted on all 
households, including those with zero education budget shares.   The table displays 100 times the difference in marginal effects 
(DME) of the variables ‘proportion of males aged 5-9’ and ‘proportion of females aged 5 to 9’.  The figures in parentheses are p-
values of the t-test of the DME, where standard errors for the t-test in column (c) were obtained by bootstrapping.   29 
Table 5b 
Difference in Marginal Effect (DME) x 100 of gender variables male10-14 and female10-14,  
and p-value of the associated t-test 
(Household-level results) 
 
State  Probit  
 
 
(a) 
Conditional  
OLS 
 
(b) 
Combined  
probit+OLS 
 
(c) = f(a,b) 
Unconditional OLS  
(Conventional 
Engel curve) 
(d) 
         
AP  19.70  -0.11  0.78  1.23 
  (.25)  (.95)  (.55)  (.34) 
         
BIH  33.90  -2.35  0.57  -0.54 
  (.04)  (.26)  (.70)  (.70) 
         
GUJ  67.30  -3.58  0.75  0.77 
  (.00)  (.15)  (.71)  (.67) 
         
HAR  16.63  -0.62  0.73  -1.19 
  (.32)  (.78)  (.72)  (.54) 
         
HIM  11.96  0.92  2.01  1.28 
  (.25)  (.74)  (.36)  (.60) 
         
KAR  5.92  -0.02  0.34  0.21 
  (.65)  (.99)  (.83)  (.88) 
         
KER  -8.86  -0.81  -1.53  -0.55 
  (.50)  (.72)  (NA)  (.81) 
         
MAH  43.70  0.50  3.05  2.21 
  (.00)  (.75)  (.03)  (.09) 
         
MP  42.99  -0.92  1.40  -0.22 
  (.00)  (.45)  (.16)  (.80) 
         
ORI  73.26  0.24  3.16  -0.20 
  (.00)  (.88)  (.01)  (.88) 
         
PUN  14.54  4.05  4.20  3.69 
  (.49)  (.26)  (.21)  (.11) 
         
RAJ  108.87  3.13  7.35  5.33 
  (.00)  (.04)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
TN  42.80  1.79  3.51  2.37 
  (.07)  (.45)  (.10)  (.22) 
         
UP  56.12  -0.50  2.56  0.87 
  (.00)  (.68)  (.02)  (.38) 
         
WB  -3.53  -1.16  -0.90  -2.20 
  (.86)  (.52)  (.50)  (.15) 
         
ASS  16.64  5.10  5.09  3.51 
  (.50)  (.08)  (.04)  (.13) 
         
 
Note:  See note in Table 5a.  The table displays 100 times the difference in marginal effects (DME) of the variables ‘proportion of 
males aged 10-14’ and ‘proportion of females aged 10 to 14’.     30 
Table 5c 
Difference in Marginal Effect (DME) x 100 of gender variables male15-19 and female15-19,  
and p-value of the associated t-test 
(Household-level results) 
 
State  Probit  
 
 
(a) 
Conditional  
OLS 
 
(b) 
Combined  
probit+OLS 
 
(c) = f(a,b) 
Unconditional OLS  
(Conventional 
Engel curve) 
(d) 
         
AP  66.25  2.57  4.62  3.41 
  (.00)  (.31)  (.01)  (.01) 
         
BIH  60.75  0.34  3.36  4.64 
  (.00)  (.91)  (.10)  (.01) 
         
GUJ  17.13  4.50  3.98  4.59 
  (.38)  (.12)  (.06)  (.01) 
         
HAR  50.03  4.67  7.67  6.49 
  (.00)  (.11)  (.00)  (.01) 
         
HIM  15.71  8.27  9.37  10.14 
  (.02)  (.01)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
KAR  39.19  5.80  6.78  5.93 
  (.00)  (.01)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
KER  -0.49  -2.88  -2.82  -0.57 
  (.94)  (.25)  (.26)  (.81) 
         
MAH  48.13  3.48  5.72  6.60 
  (.00)  (.07)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
MP  66.29  5.32  6.57  4.92 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  
          
ORI  59.59  7.10  7.40  5.78 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  
          
PUN  8.96  2.39  2.51  1.13 
  (.60)  (.55)  (.40)  (.61)  
          
RAJ  102.35  9.44  11.58  10.01 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  
          
TN  34.39  3.22  4.18  1.97 
  (.09)  (.29)  (.09)  (.30)  
          
UP  38.72  6.87  6.88  6.57 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  
          
WB  36.93  3.62  3.81  2.82 
  (.12)  (.12)  (.04)  (.10)  
          
ASS  -19.24  3.79  2.12  3.90 
  (.44)  (.31)  (.54)  (.14) 
         
 
Note:  See note in Table 5a.  The table displays 100 times the difference in marginal effects (DME) of the variables ‘proportion of 
males aged 15-19’ and ‘proportion of females aged 15 to 19’.     31 
Table 6a 
Marginal effect of the gender dummy variable MALE and p-value of the associated t-test, 
Individual level data, age group 5-9 
 
State  Probit  
 
 
(a) 
Conditional  
OLS 
 
(b) 
Combined  
probit+OLS 
 
(c) = f(a,b) 
Unconditional  
OLS  
 
(d) 
         
AP  0.129  0.27  27.3  14.9 
  (.00)  (.99)  (.01)  (.39) 
         
BIH  0.105  17.4  32.9  40.5 
  (.00)  (.28)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
GUJ  0.056  12.2  18.8  10.0 
  (.08)  (.56)  (.09)  (.61) 
         
HAR  0.039  74.9  62.4  58.1 
  (.16)  (.01)  (.02)  (.02) 
         
HIM  0.042  12.3  37.5  54.8 
  (.13)  (.74)  (.32)  (.16) 
         
KAR  0.046  -5.6  9.3  24.5 
  (.05)  (.76)  (.56)  (.15) 
         
KER  0.042  41.8  55.0  92.4 
  (.15)  (.10)  (.04)  (.01) 
         
MAH  0.005  -6.1  -2.7  4.8 
  (.82)  (.61)  (.25)  (.57) 
         
MP  0.074  21.5  24.4  26.7 
  (.00)  (.04)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
ORI  0.077  -31.7  -3.8  -7.2 
  (.01)  (.00)  (.22)  (.56) 
         
PUN  0.096  93.5  120.2  116.7 
  (.00)  (.12)  (.00)  (.01) 
         
RAJ  0.266  38.3  96.5  94.8 
  (.00)  (.02)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
TN  0.132  11.2  39.6  31.9 
  (.00)  (.63)  (.00)  (.31) 
         
UP  0.175  -10.2  46.0  40.4 
  (.00)  (.41)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
WB  0.015  2.4  3.5  5.6 
  (.62)  (.85)  (.85)  (.65) 
         
ASS  0.078  11.1  28.3  17.7 
  (.02)  (.62)  (.13)  (.83) 
         
 
Note:  In the conditional OLS equation fitted only for children with positive education spending, the dependant variable is the 
natural log of education expenditure. Thus, the coefficients of the gender dummy variables were transformed so that the marginal 
effects reported in column (b) are comparable to those in column (d), where the dependent variable is in absolute rather than log 
terms.   Column (d) pertains to the unconditional OLS of absolute education expenditure, fitted on all children, including those with 
zero education-expenditure.   The table shows the marginal effect on the gender dummy variable MALE.  The figures in 
parentheses are p-values of the t-test of the marginal effect of MALE, where standard errors for the t-test in column (c) are obtained 
by bootstrapping.    32 
 
Table 6b 
Marginal effect of the gender dummy variable MALE and p-value of the associated t-test, 
Individual level data, age group 10-14 
 
State  Probit  
 
 
(a) 
Conditional  
OLS 
 
(b) 
Combined  
probit+OLS 
 
(c) = f(a,b) 
Unconditional  
OLS  
 
(d) 
         
AP  0.140  -1.6  35.2  40.4 
  (.00)  (.93)  (.41)  (.04) 
         
BIH  0.178  12.6  64.4  72.7 
  (.00)  (.45)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
GUJ  0.161  14.9  59.9  57.1 
  (.00)  (.57)  (.02)  (.02) 
         
HAR  0.164  63.5  157.9  153.9 
  (.00)  (.04)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
HIM  0.037  105.0  134.5  135.0 
  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01) 
         
KAR  0.121  -4.0  40.2  26.0 
  (.00)  (.83)  (.23)  (.13) 
         
KER  -0.012  -13.1  -20.3  -26.6 
  (.28)  (.60)  (.44)  (.41) 
         
MAH  0.143  21.3  66.4  65.4 
  (.00)  (.09)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
MP  0.196  16.3  63.2  42.0 
  (.00)  (.16)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
ORI  0.242  4.3  60.5  42.8 
  (.00)  (.75)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
PUN  0.085  68.5  111.8  118.0 
  (.01)  (.16)  (.00)  (.02) 
         
RAJ  0.515  59.5  262.9  230.2 
  (.00)  (.01)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
TN  0.145  10.4  54.0  52.0 
  (.00)  (.68)  (.00)  (.12) 
         
UP  0.289  26.6  120.4  106.7 
  (.00)  (.04)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
WB  0.048  3.3  17.4  3.9 
  (.13)  (.89)  (.08)  (.84) 
         
ASS  0.048  42.7  54.1  34.9 
  (.07)  (.12)  (.04)  (.22) 
         
 
Note:  See note in Table 6a.   
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Table 6c 
Marginal effect of the gender dummy variable MALE and p-value of the associated t-test, 
Individual level data, age group 15-19 
 
State  Probit  
 
 
(a) 
Conditional  
OLS 
 
(b) 
Combined  
probit+OLS 
 
(c) = f(a,b) 
Unconditional  
OLS  
 
(d) 
         
AP  0.269  0.4  152.0  166.5 
  (.00)  (.99)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
BIH  0.248  34.7  142.0  144.9 
  (.00)  (.40)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
GUJ  0.198  234.1  212.8  211.2 
  (.00)  (.03)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
HAR  0.311  286.7  419.6  433.4 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
HIM  0.306  102.0  519.1  522.4 
  (.00)  (.19)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
KAR  0.184  48.4  135.8  157.1 
  (.00)  (.30)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
KER  0.019  -86.5  -27.8  -23.8 
  (.66)  (.15)  (.95)  (.66) 
         
MAH  0.300  74.5  211.1  203.3 
  (.00)  (.06)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
MP  0.300  11.6  151.8  149.1 
  (.00)  (.75)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
ORI  0.248  64.0  131.2  173.3 
  (.00)  (.14)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
PUN  0.216  7.8  265.8  202.8 
  (.00)  (.94)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
RAJ  0.384  -57.1  362.8  404.2 
  (.00)  (.65)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
TN  0.171  -46.8  91.7  83.5 
  (.00)  (.57)  (.00)  (.05) 
         
UP  0.312  98.5  211.0  226.1 
  (.00)  (.01)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
WB  0.189  18.1  124.4  167.9 
  (.00)  (.78)  (.00)  (.00) 
         
ASS  0.113  103.6  130.3  136.1 
  (.03)  (.15)  (.00)  (.08) 
         
 
Note:  See note in Table 6a.   
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Table 7 
Marginal effect (x100) of the gender variables in the probit equation of ANYEDEXP 
and p-value of the associated t-test: 
(Gender variables in household level equation redefined) 
 
  Marginal effect of MALE 
in individual level probit 
(1) 
Marginal effect of gender variable in 
household level probit 
(2) 
  Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19  Age 5-9  Age 10-14  Age 15-19 
             
AP  0.129  0.140  0.269  0,127  0.069  0.203 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  0.09  (.00) 
             
BIH  0.105  0.178  0.248  0.074  0.083  0.143 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.03)  (.02)  (.00) 
             
GUJ  0.056  0.161  0.198  0.094  0.132  0.065 
  (.08)  (.00)  (.00)  (.03)  (.01)  (.16) 
             
HAR  0.039  0.164  0.311  0.008  0.055  0.145 
  (.16)  (.00)  (.00)  (.80)  (.14)  (.00) 
             
HIM  0.042  0.037  0.306  0.058  0.011  0.046 
  (.13)  (.01)  (.00)  (.02)  (.65)  (.01) 
             
KAR  0.046  0.121  0.184  0.013  0.010  0.108 
  (.05)  (.00)  (.00)  (.68)  (.76)  (.00) 
             
KER  0.042  -0.012  0.019  0.043  -0.047  0.009 
  (.15)  (.28)  (.66)  (.04)  (.26)  (.67) 
             
MAH  0.005  0.143  0.300  0.039  0.121  0.143 
  (.82)  (.00)  (.00)  (.18)  (.00)  (.00) 
             
MP  0.074  0.196  0.300  0.042  0.136  0.152 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.10)  (.00)  (.00) 
             
ORI  0.077  0.242  0.248  0.133  0.198  0.152 
  (.01)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 
             
PUN  0.096  0.085  0.216  0.066  0.061  0.018 
  (.00)  (.01)  (.00)  (.11)  (.24)  (.66) 
             
RAJ  0.266  0.515  0.384  0.136  0.236  0.220 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 
             
TN  0.132  0.145  0.171  0.130  0.141  0.125 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.01)  (.02)  (.02) 
             
UP  0.175  0.289  0.312  0.091  0.144  0.094 
  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 
             
WB  0.015  0.048  0.189  0.031  0.015  0.129 
  (.62)  (.13)  (.00)  (.47)  (.74)  (.01) 
             
ASS  0.078  0.048  0.113  0.020  0.075  0.031 
  (.02)  (.07)  (.03)  (.59)  (.17)  (.58) 
             
Average 
marginal 
effect 
 
0.086 
 
0.156 
 
0.236 
 
0.069 
 
0.090 
 
0.111 
 
Note:  In the individual level probit, the gender variable is simply the MALE gender dummy.  In the household level 
probit in column (2), there were three gender variables: for each of the three age groups, the ‘proportion of males in all 
children of that age group within the household’.  The column (1) figures are reproduced from the first columns of 
Tables 6a, 6b and 6c. 
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Appendix Table 1 
OLS regression of budget share of education; binary probit of any education expenditure; and OLS regression of  
natural log of budget share of education, conditional on positive education expenditure  
  Andhra Pradesh  Bihar  Gujarat 
  Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Dep. variable  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE) 
  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff 
 
t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value 
Variable                                     
LNPCE  0.56  2.1  0.19  5.0  -0.40  -4.3  0.37  1.4  0.21  6.6  -0.58  -7.7  1.12  3.7  0.15  4.4  0.06  0.6 
LNHHSIZE  1.55  5.0  0.40  8.7  -0.15  -1.2  0.57  1.7  0.31  7.3  -0.29  -3.0  1.28  3.0  0.36  7.3  -0.19  -1.3 
M0TO4  -6.79  -3.0  -1.01  -3.3  -2.38  -2.8  -0.92  -0.3  -0.29  -0.8  -0.86  -1.0  -4.53  -1.5  -1.13  -3.2  -0.73  -0.7 
M5TO9  1.25  0.6  1.30  4.2  -1.12  -1.4  4.82  1.7  0.67  2.0  0.03  0.0  -1.54  -0.5  0.49  1.4  -1.58  -1.7 
M10TO14  1.65  0.7  0.56  1.9  -0.39  -0.5  8.89  3.1  0.88  2.6  1.13  1.3  2.96  1.0  0.77  2.3  -0.44  -0.5 
M15TO19  3.76  1.7  -0.16  -0.5  1.16  1.4  8.21  2.8  0.41  1.2  1.55  1.8  3.30  1.1  -0.41  -1.3  1.20  1.3 
M20TO24  -3.78  -1.6  -0.48  -1.5  0.07  0.1  5.73  1.8  -0.12  -0.3  1.39  1.5  -3.28  -1.0  -1.10  -3.1  -0.54  -0.5 
M25TO60  -3.17  -1.4  -0.45  -1.5  -1.38  -1.7  3.86  1.3  -0.08  -0.2  0.56  0.6  -2.36  -0.8  -0.38  -1.1  -0.67  -0.7 
M61MORE  -4.68  -1.6  -0.68  -1.8  -0.80  -0.8  6.03  1.5  -0.01  0.0  0.69  0.6  -4.54  -1.1  -1.13  -2.3  -0.60  -0.4 
F0TO4  -5.86  -2.6  -0.47  -1.5  -2.97  -3.6  -0.96  -0.3  -0.31  -0.9  -0.79  -0.9  -5.29  -1.8  -0.90  -2.6  -1.59  -1.7 
F5TO9  1.28  0.6  0.70  2.4  -0.80  -1.0  4.42  1.5  0.42  1.3  0.15  0.2  -1.84  -0.6  0.07  0.2  -1.08  -1.2 
F10TO14  0.42  0.2  0.36  1.2  -0.36  -0.5  9.43  3.2  0.54  1.6  1.53  1.8  2.19  0.7  0.09  0.3  0.30  0.3 
F15TO19  0.35  0.2  -0.82  -2.7  0.57  0.7  3.57  1.2  -0.20  -0.5  1.60  1.8  -1.29  -0.4  -0.58  -1.7  0.27  0.3 
F20TO24  -2.68  -1.1  -0.20  -0.6  -1.16  -1.3  -0.02  0.0  -0.47  -1.3  0.40  0.4  -1.11  -0.3  -0.77  -2.1  -0.12  -0.1 
F25TO60  -0.17  -0.1  0.44  1.5  -0.88  -1.1  2.09  0.7  0.21  0.6  0.06  0.1  3.00  1.0  0.02  0.1  0.91  1.0 
HEDYRS  0.37  9.1  0.05  8.5  0.05  3.9  0.37  10.1  0.05  10.6  0.05  5.0  0.43  7.8  0.05  7.9  0.05  3.4 
SC  -0.55  -2.3  0.00  0.0  -0.27  -3.3  -0.66  -2.3  -0.06  -1.9  -0.18  -2.3  0.31  0.7  0.00  -0.1  0.22  1.7 
ST  -1.17  -2.0  -0.08  -1.1  -0.53  -2.4  -0.77  -2.4  -0.07  -1.8  -0.28  -3.1  -0.16  -0.5  -0.03  -0.8  -0.16  -1.5 
MUSLIM  -0.37  -0.8  0.05  0.8  -0.22  -1.4  -0.18  -0.6  -0.11  -3.4  0.04  0.5  -0.10  -0.2  -0.07  -1.1  -0.02  -0.1 
CHRISTN  0.87  1.3  0.04  0.4  0.32  1.3  0.97  0.7  0.27  1.8  -0.05  -0.1  1.78  0.9  ---  ---  0.25  0.5 
WAGELAB  -0.56  -2.4  -0.08  -2.5  -0.20  -2.4  -0.77  -2.8  -0.11  -3.6  -0.09  -1.2  -0.25  -0.8  -0.04  -1.1  0.01  0.1 
INTERCEP  -3.42  -1.1      0.52  0.5  -4.85  -1.4      1.14  1.1  -8.52  -2.3      -3.72  -3.3 
Adjusted
2 R   0.1444  0.2755  0.1615  0.1570  0.1960  0.1506  0.1354  0.2250  0.1152 
N  1571  1571  1001  1787  1787  1042  1182  1182  776 
Depvar mean  0.0269  0.6372  -3.7624  0.0346  0.5831  -3.2549  0.0317  0.6548  -3.6331 
Exp. elasticity  1.21      1.11      1.35     
p-value: age5-9  0.98  0.00  0.41  0.76  0.10  0.73  0.87  0.04  0.34 
           age 10-14  0.34  0.25  0.95  0.70  0.04  0.26  0.67  0.00  0.15 
           age 15-19  0.01  0.00  0.31  0.01  0.00  0.91  0.01  0.38  0.12 
 
Note: For the unconditional OLS, the dependent variable is ESHARE or the budget share of education, and coefficients have been multiplied by 100.  For the conditional OLS, i.e. that fitted only on 
households with positive ESHARE, the dependent variable is the natural log of ESHARE or LNESHARE.  The dependent variable in the Probit is ANYEDEXP, i.e. whether household had any 
positive education expenditure in past year, as opposed to zero education spending.  Where a variable predicts success perfectly, that is indicated with a dash ---.  For example, where all Christian 
households have anyedexp=1, then the marginal effect of that variable is not identified and it is denoted with a dash ---.  Similarly, if there are no Christians in the rural part of a state in the sample, this 
is denoted with a dash ---. The last 3 rows present the p-values of F-test that in a given age-group, the coefficients of male and female demographic variables in that model/column are equal.   36 
Appendix Table 1, continued 
 
  Haryana  Himachal Pradesh  Karnataka 
  Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Dep. variable  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE) 
  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value 
Variable                                     
LNPCE  1.83  4.5  0.19  6.2  -0.01  -0.1  0.17  0.4  0.09  5.4  -0.31  -5.1  0.19  0.6  0.10  3.6  -0.34  -5.0 
LNHHSIZE  2.49  5.6  0.31  9.1  0.04  0.6  3.57  6.4  0.14  6.7  0.12  1.6  1.58  4.6  0.29  9.3  -0.08  -1.0 
M0TO4  -5.83  -1.8  -0.25  -1.1  -1.46  -2.5  -13.34  -3.6  -0.30  -2.4  -2.01  -4.2  -5.22  -2.0  -0.54  -2.5  -1.37  -2.2 
M5TO9  9.23  2.9  0.76  3.3  0.28  0.5  2.57  0.8  0.25  1.8  -0.16  -0.4  2.55  1.0  0.55  2.6  -0.10  -0.2 
M10TO14  11.75  3.6  1.02  4.2  0.80  1.4  13.43  4.1  0.21  1.7  1.46  3.6  7.67  3.2  0.75  3.7  1.28  2.3 
M15TO19  11.99  3.7  0.36  1.6  1.34  2.3  14.21  4.3  -0.05  -0.4  1.87  4.5  8.13  3.3  0.16  0.8  2.35  4.1 
M20TO24  1.68  0.5  -0.13  -0.6  0.31  0.5  -5.44  -1.5  -0.31  -2.6  0.02  0.1  3.34  1.3  -0.40  -1.9  1.17  1.9 
M25TO60  1.05  0.3  0.05  0.2  -0.43  -0.7  -7.17  -2.3  -0.25  -2.3  -0.89  -2.2  -0.96  -0.4  -0.35  -1.7  0.60  1.0 
M61MORE  -1.37  -0.3  -0.08  -0.2  -0.35  -0.4  -7.58  -1.8  -0.25  -1.8  -0.65  -1.2  -1.94  -0.6  -0.28  -1.0  0.58  0.7 
F0TO4  -4.45  -1.3  -0.18  -0.8  -1.52  -2.6  -10.16  -2.6  -0.24  -1.9  -1.55  -3.2  -4.27  -1.6  -0.41  -1.8  -0.69  -1.1 
F5TO9  6.06  1.8  0.65  2.7  -0.22  -0.4  1.64  0.5  0.13  1.0  0.13  0.3  2.86  1.1  0.57  2.7  0.24  0.4 
F10TO14  12.94  4.1  0.86  3.6  0.89  1.6  12.15  3.6  0.09  0.7  1.36  3.3  7.46  3.1  0.69  3.3  1.28  2.3 
F15TO19  5.50  1.6  -0.14  -0.6  0.72  1.2  4.07  1.2  -0.21  -1.8  0.98  2.3  2.20  0.9  -0.23  -1.1  1.37  2.3 
F20TO24  -1.59  -0.4  -0.34  -1.4  -0.27  -0.4  -0.40  -0.1  -0.20  -1.7  0.15  0.3  2.02  0.7  -0.33  -1.5  1.17  1.7 
F25TO60  3.04  1.0  0.20  1.0  -0.14  -0.3  -5.05  -1.6  -0.04  -0.4  -0.65  -1.6  1.92  0.8  -0.02  -0.1  0.66  1.1 
HEDYRS  0.37  7.4  0.02  4.5  0.05  5.9  0.39  5.6  0.01  2.7  0.05  5.3  0.28  6.3  0.02  5.3  0.04  4.3 
SC  -0.36  -1.0  -0.04  -1.4  -0.04  -0.7  -0.44  -1.0  -0.02  -1.1  -0.05  -0.8  -0.09  -0.3  -0.08  -2.6  0.03  0.4 
ST  1.39  0.6  ---  ---  0.38  1.1  -1.10  -1.1  -0.10  -2.2  -0.09  -0.7  -0.53  -1.4  -0.02  -0.5  -0.20  -2.3 
MUSLIM  -2.48  -3.7  -0.39  -6.5  -0.12  -0.9  -3.51  -2.7  -0.26  -3.3  -0.26  -1.5  -0.63  -1.8  -0.10  -3.2  0.02  0.2 
CHRISTN  -4.59  -0.8  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  2.51  1.7  -0.08  -0.6  0.63  1.8 
WAGELAB  -0.86  -2.3  -0.06  -2.3  -0.15  -2.3  -0.82  -1.0  -0.05  -1.7  -0.08  -0.7  -0.83  -2.8  -0.08  -3.3  -0.13  -1.9 
INTERCEP  -17.49  -3.9      -2.94  -3.7  0.36  0.1      -0.32  -0.5  -2.45  -0.7      -1.32  -1.7 
 
Adjusted
2 R  
 
0.2333 
 
0.2824 
 
0.1897 
 
0.2757 
 
0.3163 
 
0.3046 
 
0.1126 
 
0.1865 
 
0.1389 
N  1409  1409  1074  949  949  838  1979  1979  1435 
Depvar mean  0.0614  0.7619  -2.8315  0.0868  0.8830  -2.5700  0.0427  0.7251  -3.3266 
Exp. elasticity  1.00      1.02      1.04     
p-value of  
F-test 
                 
   Age 5-9  0.11  0.49  0.11  0.72  0.25  0.37  0.83  0.88  0.30 
   Age 10-14  0.54  0.32  0.78  0.60  0.25  0.74  0.88  0.65  0.99 
   Age 15-19  0.01  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
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  Kerala  Maharashtra  Madhya Pradesh 
  Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Dep. variable  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE) 
  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value 
Variable                                     
LNPCE  0.50  0.9  0.03  2.3  -0.17  -2.4  0.23  0.9  0.15  6.3  -0.17  -3.0  1.25  6.7  0.31  11.7  -0.09  -1.4 
LNHHSIZE  1.72  2.8  0.12  6.9  -0.15  -2.0  1.83  6.0  0.30  9.7  0.08  1.1  1.64  8.7  0.50  17.1  -0.18  -2.7 
M0TO4  -8.44  -2.4  -0.08  -1.0  -1.51  -3.2  -5.19  -2.4  -0.53  -2.8  -1.58  -3.2  -3.24  -2.0  -0.51  -2.3  -0.92  -1.6 
M5TO9  9.01  2.8  0.53  5.6  0.27  0.7  6.18  3.0  0.91  4.7  0.25  0.6  2.48  1.6  0.59  2.8  0.22  0.4 
M10TO14  15.88  5.1  0.68  6.3  1.00  2.6  11.55  5.7  0.95  4.9  1.61  3.7  5.78  3.8  1.02  4.7  0.82  1.6 
M15TO19  11.88  3.6  0.23  2.7  0.99  2.4  10.92  5.3  0.34  1.8  1.89  4.2  5.98  3.9  0.31  1.4  2.02  3.8 
M20TO24  1.23  0.4  0.07  1.0  -0.06  -0.1  3.20  1.5  -0.22  -1.2  0.61  1.3  -0.37  -0.2  -0.37  -1.5  0.44  0.7 
M25TO60  -0.78  -0.3  0.12  1.7  -0.42  -1.1  1.01  0.5  -0.16  -0.9  0.06  0.1  -1.63  -1.0  -0.06  -0.3  -0.42  -0.7 
M61MORE  -5.33  -1.2  0.00  0.0  -0.81  -1.5  -3.70  -1.3  -0.30  -1.2  -0.58  -0.9  -1.01  -0.5  -0.12  -0.4  -0.02  0.0 
F0TO4  -7.23  -2.1  0.00  0.1  -1.77  -4.0  -4.26  -2.0  -0.52  -2.7  -1.42  -2.9  -3.55  -2.3  -0.41  -1.8  -1.38  -2.5 
F5TO9  5.36  1.6  0.42  4.5  -0.06  -0.2  5.62  2.7  0.74  3.8  0.63  1.4  1.88  1.2  0.45  2.1  0.34  0.6 
F10TO14  16.43  5.4  0.77  6.1  1.09  2.9  9.34  4.5  0.51  2.7  1.53  3.4  6.00  3.9  0.59  2.7  1.02  1.9 
F15TO19  12.45  4.0  0.23  3.0  1.32  3.4  4.32  2.0  -0.14  -0.7  1.32  2.8  1.06  0.7  -0.35  -1.5  0.88  1.6 
F20TO24  2.17  0.6  0.01  0.1  0.35  0.8  -0.76  -0.3  -0.28  -1.3  0.11  0.2  -1.63  -0.9  -0.32  -1.3  -0.02  0.0 
F25TO60  2.75  0.9  0.17  2.5  -0.50  -1.3  0.69  0.3  0.06  0.4  0.23  0.5  0.25  0.2  0.23  1.1  0.16  0.3 
HEDYRS  0.46  5.6  0.01  3.1  0.04  4.1  0.23  5.4  0.03  6.1  0.02  2.8  0.38  14.2  0.05  13.0  0.07  7.8 
SC  0.45  0.7  0.00  0.3  -0.03  -0.4  0.29  0.9  0.03  1.0  0.12  1.8  -0.32  -1.8  -0.09  -3.5  -0.07  -1.1 
ST  -2.17  -0.9  ---  ---  -0.45  -1.6  -1.74  -5.9  -0.22  -7.4  -0.24  -3.4  -0.03  -0.2  -0.07  -3.2  -0.02  -0.3 
MUSLIM  -1.10  -2.1  -0.01  -0.7  -0.14  -2.1  -0.45  -0.7  -0.02  -0.4  -0.04  -0.3  -0.29  -0.7  -0.12  -1.8  -0.05  -0.4 
CHRISTN  1.38  3.0  0.00  0.2  0.10  1.8  1.89  0.9  ---  ---  0.45  1.2  8.44  7.7  0.18  1.2  1.35  4.3 
WAGELAB  -1.25  -3.0  -0.03  -2.2  -0.11  -2.2  -0.68  -2.4  -0.04  -1.5  -0.13  -1.9  -0.29  -1.7  -0.05  -2.3  -0.12  -2.0 
INTERCEP  -4.47  -0.8      -1.08  -1.5  -3.48  -1.3      -2.43  -4.1  -10.91  -5.3      -2.80  -3.9 
 
Adjusted
2 R  
 
0.2700 
 
0.3599 
 
0.2815 
 
0.2097 
 
0.2767 
 
0.1932 
 
0.2031 
 
0.2405 
 
0.1391 
N  948  948  809  2039  2039  1507  3305  3305  2036 
Depvar mean  0.0788  0.8526  -2.6175  0.0474  0.7384  -3.0901  0.0297  0.6160  -3.4757 
Exp. elasticity  1.06      1.05      1.42     
p-value of  
F-test 
                 
   Age 5-9  0.12  0.10  0.22  0.68  0.18  0.17  0.45  0.19  0.66 
   Age 10-14  0.81  0.50  0.72  0.09  0.00  0.75  0.80  0.00  0.45 
   Age 15-19  0.81  0.94  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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  Orissa  Punjab  Rajasthan 
  Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Dep. variable  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE) 
  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value 
Variable                                     
LNPCE  1.69  5.4  0.34  7.5  0.07  0.8  0.38  0.9  0.18  4.7  -0.25  -2.1  0.05  0.2  0.20  6.7  -0.32  -5.2 
LNHHSIZE  1.80  6.2  0.46  10.0  0.02  0.2  1.67  3.5  0.29  6.7  0.12  0.9  2.34  7.9  0.47  11.5  0.20  2.4 
M0TO4  0.91  0.4  0.02  0.1  0.23  0.3  -4.47  -1.2  -0.10  -0.3  -1.81  -1.7  -3.27  -1.4  -0.49  -1.7  -1.01  -1.6 
M5TO9  5.07  2.1  1.41  4.3  0.22  0.3  8.01  2.1  1.10  3.5  0.93  0.9  6.73  2.9  0.73  2.6  1.43  2.4 
M10TO14  7.55  3.2  1.64  4.9  1.40  1.9  9.46  2.6  1.15  3.9  1.05  1.1  11.53  4.9  1.54  5.3  2.20  3.7 
M15TO19  8.33  3.5  0.47  1.5  2.56  3.5  8.18  2.2  0.21  0.7  2.19  2.2  10.34  4.3  0.43  1.5  2.84  4.6 
M20TO24  2.49  1.0  -0.13  -0.4  1.14  1.5  -3.73  -1.0  0.00  0.0  -0.70  -0.7  5.15  2.0  -0.39  -1.2  1.74  2.5 
M25TO60  1.31  0.5  0.36  1.1  -0.43  -0.6  -1.04  -0.3  0.18  0.6  -0.29  -0.3  3.69  1.4  -0.02  -0.1  1.54  2.2 
M61MORE  2.23  0.8  0.43  1.1  0.19  0.2  1.39  0.3  0.08  0.2  0.22  0.2  4.99  1.5  -0.09  -0.2  1.98  2.2 
F0TO4  1.30  0.6  0.40  1.2  -0.34  -0.5  -6.44  -1.7  -0.04  -0.2  -2.62  -2.5  -2.63  -1.1  -0.55  -1.9  -0.04  -0.1 
F5TO9  4.84  2.1  0.71  2.2  0.87  1.2  5.16  1.4  0.80  2.6  0.51  0.5  2.63  1.1  0.32  1.1  0.72  1.2 
F10TO14  7.75  3.3  0.91  2.8  1.34  1.9  5.77  1.6  1.01  3.4  0.41  0.4  6.20  2.6  0.45  1.6  1.53  2.6 
F15TO19  2.55  1.1  -0.12  -0.4  0.82  1.1  7.05  1.9  0.12  0.4  1.82  1.8  0.33  0.1  -0.59  -1.9  0.83  1.2 
F20TO24  1.75  0.7  -0.09  -0.3  0.84  1.0  -2.44  -0.6  -0.23  -0.7  0.76  0.7  1.98  0.7  -0.59  -1.7  1.39  1.7 
F25TO60  3.83  1.7  0.72  2.3  0.98  1.3  1.82  0.5  0.34  1.2  0.75  0.7  2.27  1.0  -0.29  -1.0  1.29  1.9 
HEDYRS  0.38  8.8  0.05  7.7  0.07  5.7  0.56  9.6  0.03  4.8  0.08  5.3  0.44  10.9  0.03  6.5  0.08  8.3 
SC  -0.74  -2.6  0.00  0.0  -0.23  -2.6  0.38  0.9  0.01  0.2  0.02  0.2  -0.12  -0.5  -0.05  -1.7  0.01  0.1 
ST  -1.33  -5.0  -0.19  -5.2  -0.47  -5.4  0.43  0.1  ---  ---  0.25  0.3  -1.33  -4.0  -0.16  -3.8  -0.43  -4.6 
MUSLIM  -2.04  -1.9  -0.03  -0.2  -0.40  -1.5  0.14  0.1  -0.11  -1.2  0.25  0.7  -1.17  -2.3  -0.15  -2.4  -0.25  -1.9 
CHRISTN  0.45  0.7  0.22  2.8  -0.21  -1.2  0.01  0.0  -0.10  -1.1  -0.26  -0.9  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
WAGELAB  -0.44  -1.7  -0.05  -1.4  -0.14  -1.7  -1.79  -4.1  -0.07  -2.0  -0.54  -4.6  -0.12  -0.4  0.04  1.2  -0.04  -0.5 
INTERCEP  -16.68  -5.0      -4.78  -4.6  -4.79  -0.9      -1.91  -1.4  -5.62  -1.9      -2.62  -3.5 
 
Adjusted
2 R  
 
0.2313 
 
0.3102 
 
0.1869 
 
0.2121 
 
0.2516 
 
0.1857 
 
0.2240 
 
0.2742 
 
0.1965 
N  1522  1522  979  964  964  720  1599  1599  1063 
Depvar mean  0.0305  0.6432  -3.5070  0.0456  0.7464  -3.3441  0.0353  0.6648  -3.3213 
Exp. elasticity  1.55      1.08      1.01     
p-value of  
F-test 
                 
   Age 5-9  0.86  0.00  0.07  0.20  0.11  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.03 
   Age 10-14  0.88  0.00  0.88  0.11  0.49  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.04 
   Age 15-19  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.61  0.60  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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  Tamil Nadu  Uttar Pradesh  West Bengal 
  Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Dep. variable  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE)  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE) 
  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value 
Variable                                     
LNPCE  2.34  6.0  0.22  5.1  0.24  2.2  0.01  0.0  0.16  7.7  -0.46  -9.7  0.90  3.0  0.21  4.8  -0.23  -2.4 
LNHHSIZE  2.32  4.7  0.49  8.4  -0.02  -0.1  1.88  8.9  0.42  15.8  -0.08  -1.4  1.14  3.5  0.53  10.8  -0.20  -1.8 
M0TO4  -3.51  -1.1  -0.54  -1.7  -1.59  -1.7  -3.73  -2.0  -0.62  -3.0  -0.35  -0.7  -4.23  -1.5  -0.61  -1.5  -2.04  -2.2 
M5TO9  8.10  2.6  1.84  5.3  0.01  0.0  3.38  1.9  0.28  1.4  0.96  2.1  0.12  0.0  0.56  1.4  -1.20  -1.3 
M10TO14  9.40  3.0  1.80  5.2  0.49  0.5  6.14  3.5  0.66  3.4  1.57  3.5  5.10  1.9  0.58  1.5  1.02  1.2 
M15TO19  5.50  1.7  0.43  1.3  0.90  1.0  7.17  4.0  -0.09  -0.5  2.78  6.1  6.11  2.1  -0.05  -0.1  1.84  2.0 
M20TO24  0.55  0.2  -0.28  -0.8  -0.23  -0.2  4.29  2.2  -0.31  -1.4  1.83  3.6  2.06  0.7  -0.51  -1.2  0.91  1.0 
M25TO60  -3.12  -1.0  -0.24  -0.8  -0.95  -1.0  1.99  1.0  -0.24  -1.1  1.18  2.3  -2.69  -1.0  -0.42  -1.0  -0.86  -0.9 
M61MORE  -2.97  -0.7  -0.35  -0.8  -0.39  -0.3  0.96  0.4  -0.33  -1.2  1.25  2.0  -5.55  -1.6  -0.64  -1.3  -0.99  -0.8 
F0TO4  -3.83  -1.2  -0.33  -1.0  -2.31  -2.4  -2.07  -1.1  -0.41  -2.0  0.24  0.5  -4.01  -1.4  -1.07  -2.7  -1.50  -1.6 
F5TO9  5.17  1.6  1.33  4.0  -0.25  -0.3  1.83  1.0  -0.05  -0.2  1.08  2.4  -0.65  -0.2  0.38  1.0  -1.15  -1.3 
F10TO14  7.03  2.3  1.38  4.3  0.12  0.1  5.27  3.0  0.10  0.5  1.67  3.7  7.32  2.7  0.61  1.6  1.32  1.5 
F15TO19  3.53  1.1  0.09  0.3  0.25  0.3  0.60  0.3  -0.48  -2.3  1.46  3.0  3.29  1.2  -0.41  -1.0  0.91  1.0 
F20TO24  2.03  0.5  -0.48  -1.3  0.70  0.6  -1.13  -0.5  -0.52  -2.2  0.34  0.6  3.92  1.3  -0.19  -0.5  0.48  0.5 
F25TO60  1.46  0.5  -0.02  -0.1  -0.50  -0.5  1.64  0.9  0.21  1.0  0.30  0.6  3.02  1.1  0.22  0.6  0.25  0.3 
HEDYRS  0.27  4.7  0.02  3.5  0.06  3.8  0.40  14.7  0.04  11.6  0.06  10.1  0.45  10.1  0.04  7.0  0.11  8.0 
SC  0.25  0.8  0.05  1.4  0.00  -0.1  -0.60  -3.2  -0.05  -2.2  -0.14  -3.0  -0.49  -1.7  -0.08  -2.0  -0.03  -0.4 
ST  0.42  0.2  0.05  0.2  0.41  0.6  -1.32  -2.3  -0.17  -2.5  -0.20  -1.3  -0.82  -1.3  -0.11  -1.4  -0.05  -0.2 
MUSLIM  -0.86  -0.7  -0.03  -0.2  -0.30  -0.9  -1.27  -6.2  -0.16  -7.0  -0.18  -3.4  -1.51  -5.0  -0.15  -3.8  -0.36  -3.7 
CHRISTN  0.31  0.5  -0.01  -0.1  -0.01  -0.1  5.24  1.2  ---  ---  0.79  0.9  -0.07  -0.1  0.11  1.0  -0.06  -0.2 
WAGELAB  -0.55  -1.7  -0.04  -1.1  0.02  0.2  -0.42  -2.0  -0.04  -1.9  -0.03  -0.5  -0.36  -1.3  -0.09  -2.6  0.06  0.6 
INTERCEP  -20.67  -4.8      -5.05  -4.0  -2.65  -1.2      -0.75  -1.3  -7.49  -2.1      -1.62  -1.3 
 
Adjusted
2 R  
 
0.1676 
   
0.3388 
 
0.1040 
 
0.1671 
 
0.2009 
 
0.1489 
 
0.2490 
 
0.2532 
 
0.2736 
N  916  916  624  3337  3337  2229  1243  1243  768 
Depvar mean  0.0350  0.6812  -3.4513  0.0363  0.6679  -3.3172  0.0292  0.6179  -3.6473 
Exp. elasticity  1.67      1.00      1.31     
p-value of  
F-test 
                 
   Age 5-9  0.11  0.01  0.59  0.11  0.00  0.64  0.58  0.30  0.92 
   Age 10-14  0.22  0.07  0.45  0.38  0.00  0.68  0.15  0.86  0.52 
   Age 15-19  0.30  0.09  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.12  0.12 
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  Assam 
  Unconditional  
OLS 
Probit  Conditional  
OLS 
Dep. variable  (ESHARE)  (ANYEDEXP)  (LNESHARE) 
  coeff 
x 100 
t-value  marginal 
effect 
t-value  coeff  t-value 
Variable             
LNPCE  0.98  2.4  0.13  3.4  -0.22  -2.1 
LNHHSIZE  2.19  3.7  0.42  7.2  -0.11  -0.7 
M0TO4  2.41  0.6  -0.45  -1.3  0.35  0.3 
M5TO9  8.87  2.3  0.50  1.4  0.97  0.9 
M10TO14  15.24  3.9  0.76  2.1  2.76  2.7 
M15TO19  18.83  4.5  0.22  0.6  2.99  2.7 
M20TO24  8.22  1.9  -0.71  -1.9  3.18  2.7 
M25TO60  2.35  0.6  -0.48  -1.3  0.73  0.7 
M61MORE  0.86  0.2  -0.35  -0.8  0.73  0.6 
F0TO4  3.64  0.9  -0.39  -1.1  0.71  0.7 
F5TO9  8.99  2.3  0.44  1.3  0.47  0.5 
F10TO14  11.73  2.9  0.59  1.6  1.79  1.7 
F15TO19  14.93  3.6  0.41  1.1  2.27  2.1 
F20TO24  13.97  3.1  -0.42  -1.1  1.78  1.4 
F25TO60  11.79  2.9  -0.13  -0.4  1.80  1.6 
HEDYRS  0.51  8.9  0.03  7.0  0.11  7.0 
SC  -2.03  -4.1  -0.04  -0.8  -0.52  -4.2 
ST  0.16  0.4  0.02  0.6  0.20  2.0 
MUSLIM  -1.88  -4.4  -0.30  -6.5  -0.29  -2.4 
CHRISTN  -1.40  -2.8  -0.04  -0.9  -0.18  -1.5 
WAGELAB  -0.24  -0.5  -0.11  -2.3  -0.14  -1.0 
INTERCEP  -17.03  -3.4      -3.23  -2.4 
 
Adjusted
2 R  
 
0.2647 
 
0.3038 
 
0.2051 
N  941  941  707 
Depvar mean  0.0428  0.7513  -3.3651 
Exp. elasticity  1.23     
p-value of  
F-test 
     
   Age 5-9  0.94  0.73  0.24 
   Age 10-14  0.13  0.50  0.08 
   Age 15-19  0.14  0.44  0.31 
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2.   kdensity eshare if eshare>0 
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3.  kdensity lneshare if eshare>0 
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          DMEp is the male-female Difference in Marginal Effects in the probit of ANYEDEXP. 
          DMEols is the male-female Difference in Marginal Effects in the OLS of LNESHARE. 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 